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______________________________________________________________________________ 
Abstract 
 
We catalog the complete contents of All-American Analyst reports and examine the 
market reaction to their release.  Including the justifications supporting an analyst’s opinion 
reduces, and in some models eliminates, the significance of earnings forecasts and 
recommendation revisions.  Analysts both provide new information and interpret previously 
released information.  The information in a report is most important for downgrades; target 
prices and the analyst’s justifications are the only significant elements for reiterations.  No 
correlation exists between valuation methodology and either analyst accuracy or the market’s 
reaction to a report.  Our adjusted R2s are much larger than those of studies using only summary 
measures. 
JEL classifications: G11; G14; G24; M41 
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1. Introduction 
This paper investigates the association between market returns and the content of security 
analysts’ reports.  In addition, it provides the first detailed catalog of the elements in a typical 
analyst report.  An analyst’s report is the culmination of a process that includes the collection, 
evaluation, and dissemination of information related to a firm’s future performance.  The 
majority of these reports include three key summary measures: earnings forecasts, a stock 
recommendation - such as buy, sell, or hold - and a price target.  In addition, many reports 
present extensive quantitative and qualitative analysis supporting these summary measures.  
Most previous research on analyst reports examines revisions in only two summary 
elements: stock recommendations and earnings forecasts.  We extend this research by 
incorporating the contents of analyst reports in their entirety rather than just the individual 
summary elements such as the stock recommendation.  One problem in evaluating stock 
recommendations alone is that there are a limited number of recommendation levels.  More 
specifically, although analysts have five distinct recommendations - strong buy, buy, hold, sell, 
and strong sell - at their disposal, they are generally reluctant to use the two negative ratings (see, 
e.g., Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman, 2001; Mikhail, Walther, and Willis, 2004).1  By 
also incorporating the gradations available in the analysts’ price targets and the reports’ contents, 
we overcome many of the disadvantages caused by the use of a few discrete recommendation 
categories.  Our approach to this analysis is captured by the quote “In the end, stock ratings and 
target prices are just the skin and bones of analysts’ research.  The meat of such reports is in the 
analysis, detail, and tone” (see Tsao, 2002).   This is especially true for reiterations, which 
represent almost two thirds of the analyst reports in our sample.   
Using a database constructed from analyst reports issued by Institutional Investor All-
American team members during 1997-1999, our analysis shows that changes in the summary 
earnings forecasts, stock recommendations, and price targets all provide independent information 
                                                 
1 An often-cited rationale for the lack of negative ratings is that an analyst’s salary and bonus are linked to 
quantifiable measures such as his firm’s underwriting fees or commissions generated by his recommendations, 
outcomes that may be facilitated by the issuance of favorable reports.  In addition, analysts rely on company 
management for information and thus have a reason to maintain good relations with them.  SEC Regulation FD, 
which requires firms to publicly disseminate all material information, presumably reduces this incentive. 
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to the capital markets.  In particular, incorporating changes in analyst price targets dramatically 
increases the fit of our regression results over that obtained from earnings forecast revisions and 
discrete recommendations alone.  We then show that other information in a report, such as the 
strength of the written arguments made to support an analyst’s opinion, is also significant.  The 
stronger the justifications provided in the report, the larger the market’s reaction to the report.    
This holds for either aggregate strength of argument measures or several alternatives including 
independent measures for positive and negative arguments as well as many disaggregated 
justifications.  However, our results show that while the market still reacts strongly to changes in 
price targets, the significance of earnings forecast and recommendation revisions is reduced and, 
in some models, eliminated.  
After analyzing all the elements of an analyst report (i.e. earnings forecast, analyst 
recommendation, price target, and the justifications given), we next examine whether the 
market’s reaction is affected by variations in firm specific characteristics, the release of 
contemporaneous information, or recommendation type (e.g., upgrade, reiteration, or 
downgrade).  Consistent with other studies, the market’s reaction to earnings revisions and 
recommendation downgrades, when considered separately, is significantly larger for small firms 
and for firms with less analyst following.  We find a similar result for price target revisions.  
However, when all three summary measures and the proxy for the strength of an analyst’s 
justifications are included simultaneously, only the reaction to price target revisions is still 
significantly affected by these factors.  
To examine if an analyst report provides new information to the market or whether it 
merely reiterates or interprets information previously released, we identify any contemporaneous 
release of information concerning earnings, dividend changes, stock splits, changes in business 
expectations, equity issues, debt issues, mergers and divestitures, major management changes, 
credit rating changes, lawsuits and significant contract and/or product introductions.  
Approximately half of the analyst reports in our sample occur simultaneously with these other 
information releases.  When we re-estimate our regressions on the sub-sample of observations 
that are free of confounding events, all our results are qualitatively similar.  When, however, we 
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run the regressions on the sub-sample of firms for which a contemporaneous information release 
does exist, the only significant coefficients are the proxy for strength of an analyst’s arguments 
and price target revisions.  This suggests that for these reports, the analyst’s role is to provide 
interpretation of information releases to the market.   
Our analysis also shows that the market treats an analyst’s report differently based on 
whether a report reiterates an old recommendation or provides an upgrade or downgrade.  We 
find that the contents of an analyst’s report receive the most scrutiny in the case of downgrades.  
The changes in a firm’s price target and the strength of a report’s arguments are both significant 
and positively correlated with the market’s response.   Conversely, the proxy for a relationship 
between a brokerage and the firm is significantly negative.  This last result suggests that the 
market amplifies bad news when the brokerage is not independent of the firm.  In the case of 
reiterations, the only significant coefficients are the strength of an analyst’s arguments and price 
target changes.  None of the examined factors are significant in the direction predicted for 
upgrades.   
Finally, we examine the accuracy of price targets and the effects of the valuation 
methodology employed by an analyst.  We consider a price target prediction to be accurate if the 
analyzed firm’s stock price equals the 12-month projected price at any time during the year 
following the release of a report.  Using this definition of accuracy, approximately 54% of 
analysts’ price targets are achieved or exceeded.  The remaining 46% of firms achieve an 
average of 84% of the price target within 12 months.  The level of optimism exhibited by an 
analyst, as measured by the projected change in a firm’s stock price, appears to be inversely 
related to the probability of achieving a particular target.  We find no correlation between the 
valuation methodology used by analysts and either the market’s reaction to a report’s release or 
to their accuracy in predicting price targets.  In fact, most analysts use a simple earnings multiple 
valuation model.  Only a minority use Net Present Value or other discounted cash flow 
approaches favored by finance textbooks and MBA curriculums. 
In Section 2 we summarize prior research.  Section 3 describes the data and sample 
selection criteria as well as a typical analyst report.  We discuss our empirical results in Section 
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4.  Sections 5 and 6 provide results on price target accuracy and valuation methodologies.  
Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Prior Research  
 Over the past two decades, security analysts’ reports have been the subject of extensive 
empirical and experimental work.  Early investigations are primarily related to either the 
market’s reaction to revisions in analysts’ earnings forecasts or recommendations.  Most of this 
work shows positive (negative) abnormal returns for upward (downward) earnings forecast 
revisions or new buy (sell) recommendations.  For example, Abdel-Khalik and Ajinkya (1982) 
find significant abnormal returns during the publication week of forecast revisions by Merrill 
Lynch analysts.  Similarly, Lys and Sohn (1990) present evidence consistent with forecast 
revisions having information content (see also Stickel, 1991).   
 Research on revisions in analyst recommendations has also found a positive association 
between abnormal returns and the direction of a recommendation change.  Lloyd-Davies and 
Canes (1978) indirectly examine the market reaction to security analyst recommendations by 
studying stock suggestions appearing in the Wall Street Journal’s “Heard on the Street” column.  
They find an event day return of 0.93% (-2.37%) for new buy (sell) recommendations (see also 
Bjerring, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 1983; Elton, Gruber, and Grossman, 1986; Liu, Smith, 
and Syed, 1990; Beneish, 1991; Stickel, 1995).  More recently, Womack (1996) uses First Call 
data to directly examine price reactions for stock recommendation changes to and from the most 
extreme buy and sell categories.  He finds that stocks added to (removed from) strong buy lists 
earned size adjusted returns of 2.98% (-1.94%) while stocks added to (removed from) strong sell 
lists earned size adjusted returns of -4.69% (0.32%) in the 3-day event period surrounding the 
release of the recommendation revision.  In most of these studies, reiterations of a previous 
forecast or recommendation are ignored.  In our paper, by examining the content of an analyst 
report beyond the summary recommendation, we are able to draw conclusions about reiterations 
as well as revisions.   
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Our work is also related to more recent research investigating security returns conditional 
on examining both earnings forecast and recommendation revisions simultaneously.  For 
example, Francis and Soffer (1997) find that neither earnings forecast revisions nor stock 
recommendations completely incorporate the information in the other signal.  They also show 
that when a report is summarized by a favorable stock recommendation, investors rely on 
earnings forecast revisions to a greater extent.  Stickel (1995), in addition to the summary 
recommendation and earnings forecast revisions, includes proxies for the magnitude of the 
recommendation revision, the analyst’s reputation, the size of the analyst’s brokerage house, and 
the analyzed firm’s information environment.  His results are consistent with those of Francis 
and Soffer indicating that earnings forecast revisions are informative even in the presence of a 
summary recommendation.  He also finds that company size and analyst reputation affect returns 
for buy recommendations, while the magnitude of the recommendation revision and brokerage 
size affect returns for sell recommendations.  Although the Francis and Soffer and Stickel studies 
include a broad cross-section of potential factors that contribute to the market’s reaction to a new 
recommendation, they do not consider price targets or the content of the reports and the adjusted 
R
2
s for their models are low.  The adjusted R
2
 for Stickel’s study is 1% for his buy regression 
and 2% for his sell regression, suggesting that important pieces of the puzzle are missing.  
Francis and Soffer get an adjusted R
2
 of 5% for their cross-sectional model.   
Our research on analyst reports is contemporaneous with recent research incorporating 
price targets as a source of information.  Bradshaw (2002) documents, using a sample of 103 
analyst reports, that target prices are reported more frequently in favorable reports.  Bradshaw 
and Brown (2002), using a large sample of firms, find that price targets are realized a majority of 
the time and that individual analysts differ in their accuracy.  Brav and Lehavy (2003) reexamine 
Francis and Soffer’s question of simultaneous information by adding price targets to earnings 
forecasts and recommendation levels.  Using a large database of price targets, they find a 
significant market reaction to price targets both unconditionally and conditional on simultaneous 
recommendation and earnings forecast revisions.  They then regress the three variables on the 
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market’s reaction and find adjusted R
2
s of almost 8%, well above the 5% found by Francis and 
Soffer.   
Finally, our work is related to Previts, Bricker, Robinson, and Young (1994) and Hirst, 
Koonce, and Simko (1995) who consider the written content of a report.  Previts et al use word 
recognition software to examine the terminology used in analyst reports, but do not perform any 
statistical analysis on either the content of the reports or on the market’s reaction to the reports.  
Hirst et al use an experimental setting to investigate how potential investors assess the 
information contained in security analysts’ reports.  They assume two levels of strength of 
argument (strong or weak), two levels of recommendation (favorable or unfavorable) and two 
sources of the report (independent brokerage or analyzed firm’s investment bank).  They find 
that when a report is unfavorable the strength of the arguments contained in an analyst’s report 
affects investors’ judgments.  This result conflicts with Francis and Soffer (1997) who find that 
investors are more likely to rely on other information in cases of good news reports.  
Furthermore, Hirst et al report that experimental investors react more strongly to negative reports 
from analysts who lack independence.  The effects associated with a lack of independence are 
similar to those found in Michaely and Womack (1999), which documents that the mean excess 
returns around a buy recommendation revision are lower when the recommendation is made by 
an underwriter rather than by an unaffiliated brokerage.  
This paper differs from other recent work, such as Brav and Lehavy (2003) and 
Bradshaw (2002), in that we examine the complete text of a large sample of actual analyst 
reports and our analysis provides information beyond earnings forecasts, recommendations, and 
price targets.  We demonstrate that other information, such as the strength of the analyst’s 
justifications, is also important and when considered simultaneously reduces, and in some 
models eliminates, the significance of the information available in earnings forecasts and 
recommendation revisions.  By controlling for the simultaneous release of other information, we 
show that analyst reports do not merely repeat other firm releases of information, but also 
provide new and independent analysis to the market.  By examining whether the market’s 
reaction differs by report type (i.e. upgrade, reiteration, or downgrade), we demonstrate that 
  
 
7 
information in a report is more important for downgrades than for upgrades.  Furthermore, the 
only elements that matter for reiterations are target prices and the strength of the arguments.  
Finally, our R² of nearly 26% is three or four times larger than that of other studies using only 
partial content from analyst reports. 
 
3. Sample Selection and Data Description  
3.1. Sample selection 
Our analysis uses a total of 1,126 complete analysts’ reports written by 56 unique sell-
side analysts from 11 different investment banks covering 46 industries as provided by the 
Investext database.  Investext features current research reports from more than 630 investment 
banks, brokerage houses, and research firms worldwide including, but not limited to, Credit 
Suisse First Boston, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, and 
Salomon Smith Barney.  Each report was read in its entirety and coded by hand for 30 separate 
data fields. 
There are a number of financial databases that catalog and summarize earnings forecasts 
and analyst recommendations (e.g., Zacks Investment Research and I/B/E/S).  To the best of our 
knowledge, however, there are currently no databases that provide similarly compiled 
information that includes analyst price targets and other information, such as valuation 
methodologies or justifications for recommendations made, typically found in an analyst report.  
The only way to collect this information is to read individual analyst reports and hand code the 
contents.  To generate our sample, we select equity analyst reports that were written in 1997, 
1998, or 1999 by a member of Institutional Investor’s All-America Research Team.  To qualify 
for inclusion in the sample, an analyst must have achieved at least one “First Team” ranking.  
We chose these analysts because they have been independently recognized as top analysts in 
their given industries.  Furthermore, prior research finds that All-America Research Team 
members supply more accurate earnings forecasts than other analysts (e.g., Stickel, 1992) and 
their recommendation revisions result in a stronger stock market reaction than that observed for a 
typical analyst (see Stickel, 1995). 
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During our sample period, the number of analysts receiving top honors in the Institutional 
Investor survey each year ranged from 76 to 84.  However, since many analysts were multiple 
year winners, only 153 unique analysts are represented in our sample.  In addition to being 
written by a recent All-America Research Team member, the report must also be available 
through both the Zacks Investment Research (Zacks) and Investext Databases.  When we began 
our initial analysis, Investext did not allow users to search reports by analyst.  As a result, we 
used Zacks to generate a list of reports written by our sample of analysts.2  Zacks identified 
approximately 7,100 reports that met our year and analyst criteria.  These analyst reports 
consisted of both company and industry reports.3  All of these analyst reports were then cross-
referenced in the Investext database using company and brokerage identifiers as well as report 
dates obtained from Zacks. 
In our matching, 21 analysts could not be included in our sample because the investment 
firms that employ them do not provide reports to Investext (e.g., Goldman Sachs).  We realize 
that this introduces a potential bias into our sample, as only firms willing to make their reports 
publicly available are included within our sample.  Moreover, five of the 99 industries for which 
Institutional Investor issues a ranking, Accounting and Tax Policy, Convertibles, Equity 
Derivatives, Multi-Industry, and Quantitative Research, do not require that analysts follow any 
specifically identified firms.  We excluded these categories, which represented seven additional 
analysts, from our sample.  In total, we omit 28 analysts from our All-America Research Team 
sample, leaving 125 unique analysts.  
Unfortunately, the Investext database is less complete than Zacks and we were only able 
to find a subset of the Zacks reports.4  More specifically, Investext contains fewer analysts and 
does not contain as many reports by the analysts it does list.  Of the analyst reports listed in 
                                                 
2 Investext has since released a newer version that provides more search options including a category for report 
author. 
3 We omit industry reports from our sample since these reports do not usually contain new company specific 
information but rather serve as a summary across firms.  Furthermore, if an analyst reports new information about a 
company and/or changes his recommendations in an industry report, he usually issues a concurrent company report 
as well.   
4 Zacks also appears to be incomplete.  Investext contains some reports by particular analysts that were not identified 
in our search of Zacks.  In both Investext and Zacks, coverage significantly improves in the latter part of our sample 
period. 
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Zacks, the percentages found in Investext were less than 13.1%, 12.4%, and 50.3% in 1997, 
1998, and 1999 respectively.  Our final sample includes 1,126 reports consisting of 262 
upgrades, 739 reiterations, and 125 downgrades, written by 56 analysts. 
Having identified our sample, the primary challenge remaining was determining the 
correct announcement date for each report.  Firms often release key information contained in the 
analyst report before the actual report is dated and made available.  As a consequence, the 
announcement dates given by many analyst databases, including Zacks, often differ from the 
date given on the report.  In our sample, 58.6% of all report dates matched the announcement 
date exactly, leaving 41.4% of the analyst reports dated differently from the Zacks dates.  Of the 
reports where dates differed, 92% of the time the report date fell after the corresponding Zacks 
date. 
Obtaining the correct date is clearly important, given that our analysis involves 
examining the market reaction to information releases from the reports.  We explored various 
sources of news releases including Dow Jones and Lexis-Nexus, as well as finance websites such 
as Yahoo, to determine the correct information announcement date for a random sample of 50 
reports.  We found that Zacks was particularly accurate in reporting recommendation release 
dates and thus we used its dates as our announcement dates whenever possible. 
 
3.2. Typical analyst report  
Table 1, Panels A and B, presents summary statistics on average values and frequency of 
reporting for several of the data fields that we collect from each analyst report.  All reports 
contain a summary stock recommendation and our table is organized by recommendation 
category, such as upgrade to strong buy or downgrade to hold, as well as by the combined 
categories all upgrades, all reiterations, or all downgrades, and a total sample column.5  The 
majority of the reports also include summary earnings forecasts and price targets.  Additional 
data included in each report in support of the authoring analyst’s forecasts and opinions are also 
                                                 
5 An analyst’s report generally indicates whether its recommendation is an upgrade, downgrade or reiteration.  In 
cases where the previous recommendation is indeterminate, we use the previous recommendation as conveyed by 
Zacks to classify the report. 
  
 
10 
presented in Table 1.  These include the prevalence of accounting statement forecasts and 
segment data analyses, data regarding relationships between the analyst’s brokerage and the firm, 
data regarding the valuation methods employed, and the analyst’s qualitative justifications of his 
or her recommendation.   
Consistent with other studies and recent press reports, we find that analysts rarely issue 
sell or strong sell recommendations.  Line 2 of Table 1, Panel A, shows that only 0.5% of the 
recommendations in our sample fall into these two categories.  In contrast, 30.8% of the 
recommendations are classified as strong buy, 40.0% as buy, and 28.7% as hold.  We also find 
that the majority of reports issued across all recommendations are reiterations.  The last three 
columns before the Total column in Table 1, Panel A, show that upgrades, downgrades, and 
reiterations represent 23.3%, 11.1%, and 65.5% of our sample, respectively.   
One hundred percent of our reports contain a summary stock recommendation and almost 
all reports also provide EPS forecasts; 99.1% for the current fiscal year and 95.3% for at least 
one subsequent year.  Only 22.7% of our analyst reports contain forecasts beyond one year. 
There is no notable difference in the percentage of reports that contain one-year earnings 
forecasts across recommendation types.  At 89.6%, the downgrade to hold recommendations are 
the only category of subsequent year forecasts to fall below 90%.  
Price targets, which are the analyst’s price forecasts, are only present in 72.6% of 
analysts’ reports.  They are given as either a point estimate or a range that the stock price is 
expected to achieve within the next 12 months.  Price targets, while not as common as 
recommendations or earnings forecasts in the total sample, are even less frequent for unfavorable 
reports.  In our sample, while over 90% of all strong buy or buy recommendations include price 
targets, only 11.1% of hold reiterations and 50.6% of hold downgrades include these projections.  
Overall, 95.8% of upgrades, 65.5% of reiterations, and 65.6% of downgrades include price 
forecasts.  It appears that analysts’ reluctance to issue negative information via downgrades 
extends to price targets as well, although not as strongly.  In fact, 62.8% of downgrades that do 
not include a price target in the current report had one in the prior report.  In light of recent 
events, some investment banks are specifically requiring their analyst to disclose price targets in 
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reports with a positive recommendation (e.g., Merrill Lynch).  In addition, these banks are 
including a stock chart indicating the points at which they changed their recommendations or 
price targets. 
The projected stock price increase, i.e. the percentage the price target is above the current 
price, varies systematically across recommendation categories.  For example, the third line under 
the category Price Targets in Table 1, Panel A, shows that the average projected increase over 
the current stock price for an upgrade to strong buy or buy are 34.6% and 22.6%, respectively.  
Interestingly, reiterations have even higher stock price increases than upgrades for each 
recommendation category.  For the entire sample, reiterations project an average 36.6% increase 
while upgrades project a 28.9% average increase.  Price targets below current market price are 
fairly uncommon.  Even in unfavorable reports such as a downgrade to hold, the average 
projected increase is a positive 5.5%.   
In addition to price targets and earnings forecasts, we compile information on income 
statements, balance sheets, statements of cash flow, and segment forecasts.  Based on our 
sample, financial statement forecasts are not disclosed as frequently as earnings or price 
forecasts.  Of the reports in our sample, 28.5% contain income statement forecasts, 5.1% contain 
balance sheet forecasts, and 17.1% contain statement of cash flow forecasts.  Although the 
percentages of upgrade and downgrade reports that contain income statement forecasts are 
similar (46.6% and 40.0%, respectively), these percentages are much higher than those of 
reiterated reports, which contain these forecasts only 20.1% of the time.  Similar patterns exist 
for balance sheet and cash flow forecasts.  Very few analyst reports contain geographic (3.6%), 
product (4.2%), or segment information (10.0%). 
We also collect information on existing relationships between the company and the 
investment bank writing the report.  Analysts are required to provide this information as a 
disclaimer in their report.  Of the firms examined, 52.6% have an underwriting relationship with 
the analyst’s brokerage.  The underwriting relationship is similar across both upgrades and 
reiterations at 53%.  Downgrades are only slightly less frequent with an underwriting 
relationship in 46.4% of the cases examined.  Differences in current holdings are more varied.  
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Investment banks have holdings in 84.2% of the firms analyzed.  Holdings of company stock 
exist in 68.2%, 63.2% and 93.4% of upgrades, downgrades and reiterations, respectively.   
Next, we document the valuation methods used by the analysts in Table 1, Panel A, under 
the category Valuation Models.  We find that 99.1% of analysts mention they use some sort of 
earnings multiple (e.g., a price to earnings ratio, EBITDA multiple, or a relative price to earnings 
ratio).  Only 12.8% of analysts report using any variation of discounted cash flow in computing 
their price targets.  Notably, the discounted cash flow method is much more prevalent in 
downgraded reports, 20.8% compared to 13.7% and 11.1% in upgrades and reiterations, 
respectively.  Valuation models based on asset multiples are used in 25.1% of all reports and 
22.9%, 27.6% and 15.2% of upgrades, reiterations and downgrades, respectively.  Very few 
analysts use alternative valuation methodologies.  Other valuation methods not falling into one of 
the three categories discussed above are observed in less than 3.5% of our sample.  We include 
PEG (PE to growth) under alternative valuation methodologies since only seven of the 1126 
analyst reports in our sample use them.  All analysts who mention a valuation method use an 
earnings multiple.  That is, the 0.9% that do not mention an earnings multiple do not mention any 
valuation method. 
Finally, Table 1, Panel B, catalogs the analyst’s qualitative justifications of his or her 
recommendation.  Positive and negative remarks are recorded for fourteen specific criteria: 
revenue growth, earnings growth, new product introductions, new projects, cost efficiencies, 
expectations met, mergers and acquisitions, repurchase programs, industry climate, management, 
international operations, leverage, competition, and risk.  Only 3% of our sample reports (i.e. 34) 
do not contain some justification of the recommendations. 
 
3.3. Model variables 
Our empirical analyses require us to calculate several variables not directly provided in 
the analyst reports we examine (see Table 1, Panel C).  The first model variable we compute is 
the percentage change in an analyst’s earnings forecast for a firm (EARN_REV).  This is the 
new earnings forecast divided by the old earnings forecast minus 1.  Since the current report does 
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not usually contain the previous earnings forecast, we collect previous earnings forecasts from 
Investext, using the report immediately preceding the one in our sample.  We obtain previous 
earnings forecasts for 1,029 reports, 91.4% of our sample.  We find average earnings forecast 
changes of 4.1% and 4.0% for strong buy and buy upgrades, respectively.  In contrast, 
unfavorable reports such as a downgrade to buy or hold generally experience reductions in 
forecasted earnings.  Downgrades to buy result in an average reduction in earnings forecasts of 
7.3%, while downgrades to hold experience a reduction of 4.5%.  Overall, upgrades, 
downgrades, and reiterations experience earnings forecast changes of 4.1%, -3.6%, and -2.1% 
respectively. 
The second model variable we compute is the percentage change in an analyst’s price 
target forecast for a firm (TGT_REV).  This is the new price target divided by the old price 
target minus 1.  Since the current report rarely contains the previous price target, we collect 
previous price target information, as available from Investext as described above.  We obtain 
previous price targets for 664 reports or 59.0% of our sample.6  We find an average price target 
change of 2.8% for the total sample.  The average price target changes are 13.8% and 5.5% for 
strong buy and buy upgrades, respectively.  In contrast, we find price target changes of only 
1.0% and 2.7% for strong buy and buy reiterations.  Downgrades to buy result in an average 
reduction in price targets of 7.0%, while downgrades to hold experience an average reduction of 
7.5%.  Overall, upgrades, downgrades, and reiterations experience average price target changes 
of 11.4%, -7.3%, and 1.9%, respectively.  Except for sell reiterations and downgrades to hold 
and strong sell, the average price target revisions are more positive than the average earnings 
forecast revisions.  Earnings forecast revisions and price target changes are the only model 
variables not computed for every report in our sample.   
To measure the relationship between the firm analyzed and the analyst’s employer, we 
construct another model variable, a proxy for underwriter affiliation and stock holdings 
(UND_HLD).  This indicator variable takes on a value of 0 if no relationship between the 
                                                 
6 We cannot be certain that the price target or earnings forecast (above) we obtain is from the report immediately 
prior to our sample report due to reports missing on Investext.  Errors from obtaining earlier targets or earnings 
forecasts should weaken our results.  This is discussed further in Section 4. 
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analyst’s brokerage and the firm exists, 1 if the brokerage is an underwriter of the firm or has 
current holdings in the firm, and 2 if the brokerage is both an underwriter and has current 
holdings.  The average UND_HLD is similar for upgrades and downgrades with a value of 1.2 
and 1.1, respectively.  Reiterations are slightly higher with an average value of 1.5. 
We model the analyst’s qualitative justifications for his or her opinion by constructing a 
“strength of arguments” variable (STR_ARG).  This variable is computed by aggregating the 
number of positive remarks less the number of negative remarks from Table 1, Panel B.  The 
analyst reports were read for any mention of the 28 recommendation categories in Table 1, Panel 
B.  Positive comments about a category are given a value of +1 and negative comments are given 
a value of -1.  For example, if a report mentions revenues are expected to increase, the category 
increasing revenues is given a value of +1; if a report mentions that revenues are expected to 
decrease, the category decreasing revenues is given a value of -1.  The percentage of reports 
having comments in each category is given in Table 1, Panel B.  Upgrades have an average 
strength value of 2.8 compared to 1.7 for reiterations and -0.2 for downgrades.  It is notable that 
downgrades still result in an average score close to zero.  This is consistent with the desire to 
minimize management retaliation since company management is a key source of information and 
future underwriting business. 
This process differs from that employed by Hirst, Koonce and Simko (1995) who had 
subjects rate the strength of the report’s comments on a scale from 1 to 15.  We considered trying 
to code intensity but found it to be less objective than merely tabulating positive or negative. 
That is, an analyst may remark they expect a “large” or a “very large” improvement in revenue 
growth.  Different observers may code these as different intensities, and indeed different analysts 
may have different meanings for “large” and “very large”.  Our approach removes subjective 
differences between both analysts and readers.  The list of factors was initially compiled by all 
the authors independently and cross-checked with each other.  Once the standard coding was 
agreed upon, the authors and RAs read all reports again.  Over 75% of the reports were read by 
at least one author.  There is no significant difference in the coding patterns between authors and 
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RAs.  While not perfect, we believe our method is unbiased and reasonably objective.  
Importantly, our measure yields statistically significant empirical results. 
Next, we measure the market’s reaction to the release of analyst reports with CAR, our 
fifth model variable.  CAR is the five-day market adjusted cumulative abnormal return centered 
on the report release date.  The average mean CAR for all firms in our sample is a negligible 
0.3%.  Consistent with our expectations and prior research, we find a statistically positive 
average mean return of 4.5% for upgrades, a statistically negative mean return of -6.6% for 
downgrades and an insignificant mean reaction of 0.0% for reiterations.  Breaking up report 
types into specific summary categories yields similar results.  Upgrades to strong buy and buy 
result in significant mean returns of 4.7% and 4.1%, respectively.  Downgrades to buy and hold 
result in significant negative mean returns of -7.0% and -6.4%, on average.  The mean CARs for 
upgrades and downgrades are all statistically different from zero with a two-tailed probability 
less than 0.01.  Reiterations are generally small and insignificant with one exception:  reiterations 
of hold recommendations have an average mean return of -1.1%.  Reports representing hold 
upgrades, sell and strong sell downgrades or reiterations have too few observations to draw any 
reliable conclusions as to average market reactions.  We find that a particular report’s direction 
(e.g., upgrade, downgrade, or reiteration) tends to dominate the specific recommendation level. 
The differences in the observed market reaction between strong buy upgrades and buy upgrades, 
buy downgrades and hold downgrades, or strong buy reiterations versus buy reiterations are all 
insignificant.  As such, although we provide descriptive statistics for reports categorized by both 
report type and summary recommendation, our primary empirical tests are performed on reports 
categorized by direction only. 
Table 2 presents the Spearman and Pearson correlations for the model variables and the 
recommendation revisions in our sample.  As expected from the last four columns in Table 1, 
Panel C, both the Spearman and Pearson correlations between CAR and UP_GR are positive and 
highly significant, while the correlations between CAR and DOWN_GR are negative and highly 
significant.  The Pearson correlation is not significant between CAR and REIT although the 
Spearman correlation is significantly negative. 
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More interestingly, our model variables EARN_REV and STR_ARG are highly and 
positively correlated (Spearman = 0.40, Pearson 0.17).  This relation suggests that positive 
(negative) earnings forecast revisions are generally supported by more optimistic (pessimistic) 
analyst statements.  A similar result is observed between TGT_REV and STR_ARG.  The 
Spearman and Pearson correlations between CAR and STR_ARG are 0.30 and 0.33 whereas 
between CAR and EARN_REV they are only 0.18 and 0.11 respectively.  These results suggest 
that the market unconditionally reacts more to the analyst’s qualitative arguments than to the 
actual earnings revisions that the analyst makes.  The correlations between CAR and 
DOWN_GR and CAR and UP_GR are about the same as between CAR and STR_ARG 
suggesting a role for the strength of an analyst’s arguments at least as strong as that of a 
recommendation revision.  Only the Pearson correlation for TGT_REV and CAR is higher than 
that of the strength of arguments variable.  These unconditional correlations support the view 
that investors use the qualitative information in an analyst’s report.  This conclusion is further 
supported by the regression results below.  
 
3.4  Firm Specific Variables 
For each firm in our sample of analyst reports, we collect proxies for size (SIZE), growth 
versus value (MKT_BK), and analyst coverage (ANALYSTS).  SIZE is measured as the log of 
market value of equity from CRSP, MKT_BK is the ratio of the firm’s market value of equity to 
the firm’s book value from COMPUSTAT, and ANALYSTS is the total number of analysts 
following the firm (not just All-American analysts) from Zacks.  Descriptive statistics for these 
variables are given in the second section of Table 1, Panel C.  There appear to be a few 
systematic differences between the various categories of reports.  For example, market-to-book 
ratios tend to be lower for downgrades (1.67) than either reiterations or upgrades (2.33 and 2.44).  
These variables allow us to determine if the market’s reaction to analyst reports differs for large 
versus small firms, growth versus value firms, or firms which are heavily followed. 
 
3.5. Other Information Releases 
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 To investigate the confounding effects of other information that may be released 
simultaneously with the analyst report, we collect all announcements of the following events: 
earnings, dividend changes, stock splits, changes in business expectations, new equity and debt 
financing, mergers and divestitures, credit rating changes, lawsuits, new product introductions, 
new contracts, and management changes.  This information was collected from multiple sources.  
Earnings announcements are from Zacks.  Dividend changes and stock splits are from CRSP.  
All other information is from the Dow Jones Newswire.  We define information to be 
simultaneous if it occurs within a nine-day window centered on the analyst report’s release date.   
The third section of Table 1, Panel C catalogs the number of analyst reports that occur 
with and without other information.  As seen there in the last line, 47% of all reports do not 
occur contemporaneously with the above-mentioned announcements.  The percentage is highest 
for upgrades with 60.3% and lowest for reiterations with 41.5%.  The primary source of other 
information is earnings announcements with 31.4% of all reports having an earnings 
announcement within plus or minus four days of the analyst report.  The next largest source of 
other information is announcements about changes in expectations with 11.35%.   
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Report Content:  Earnings, recommendations, price target revisions, and justifications  
We first document that the market reacts to earnings forecasts, recommendation 
revisions, and price targets contained in a security analyst report at the time of its release.  
Market reaction is measured by five-day market adjusted returns centered on the report’s release 
date.  This allows for possible delays by a brokerage in delivering its forecasts to Zacks or for 
leaks of information prior to its public release.  Next, we show that the strength of the arguments 
used in a report is a significant factor in explaining the market’s reaction.  We also investigate 
the presence of an underwriting relationship or current stock holdings between the analyst and 
the firm.  
Table 3 provides the results of estimating the following regression using ordinary least 
squares:   
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CARj,t = α0 + α1EARN_REVj,t + α2UP_GRj,t + α3DOWN_GRj,t + α4TGT_REVj,t 
                           + α5 STR_ARGj,t + α6 UND_HLDj,t  + εj,t  (1) 
 
where the variables are defined as follows: 
 
CARj,t =  five-day market adjusted cumulative abnormal return for firm j centered on 
the report release date t; 
 
EARN_REVj,t = 
 
Percentage change in the analyst’s earnings forecast for firm j at time t 
computed as [(earnings forecast at time t / earnings forecast at time t-1) – 1];  
 
UP_GRj,t =  a variable taking on the value 1 for reports issued for firm j at time t that 
indicates the analyst’s recommendation has been upgraded, 0 otherwise; 
 
DOWN_GRj,t =  a variable taking on the value 1 for reports issued for firm j at time t that 
indicates the analyst’s recommendation has been downgraded, 0 otherwise; 
 
TGT_REVj,t =  Percentage change in the analyst’s projected price target for firm j at time t 
computed as [(price target at time t / price target at time t-1) – 1];  
 
STR_ARGj,t =  a variable computed by aggregating the number of positive remarks less the 
number of negative remarks related to 14 specific criteria:  revenue growth, 
earnings growth, new product introductions, new projects, cost efficiencies, 
expectations met, mergers and acquisitions, repurchase programs, industry 
climate, management, international operations, leverage, competition, and 
risk; 
 
UND_HLDj,t =  a variable taking on the value 0 if no relationship between the analyst’s 
brokerage and the firm exists, 1 if the brokerage is an underwriter of the firm 
or has current holdings in the firm, and 2 if the brokerage is both an 
underwriter and has current holdings; 
 
εj,t =  assumed normally distributed error term with zero mean and constant 
variance. 
 
 The coefficients EARN_REVj,t and TGT_REVj,t are computed using earnings and price 
target forecasts from the current report and the most recent prior report if released within 60 days 
of our report.  As described previously, we collect prior earnings and price targets from the same 
analyst’s Investext report immediately preceding ours.  Since Investext is not complete, i.e. it 
does not contain all reports, there is a chance that another report was released after the prior 
report we collect.  If so, this will make our regression results weaker.  Since an analyst usually 
writes a minimum of six reports a year on the companies they follow, we do not include 
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revisions from prior reports issued more than 60 days before our report.  This restriction 
minimizes the effect of missing reports.  Regressions using longer time periods, e.g. 60 to 90 
days or all reports over 90 days, provide qualitatively similar results, however, the significance 
levels of the variables are reduced. 
 Columns 1, 2, and 3 of Table 3 present the results from estimating regressions for 
earnings forecast revisions, recommendation revisions, and changes in price targets individually 
(i.e., only including those proxy variables in the OLS regressions).  If, as documented in prior 
research, the market reacts to changes in earnings forecasts and the stock recommendation 
contained in the typical security analyst report, the coefficients EARN_REV in column 1 and 
UP_GR in column 2 will be positive while DOWN_GR in column 2 will be negative.  If as 
predicted, analyst price target revisions have information, TGT_REV in column 3 will be 
positive.   
 Consistent with prior research, we find that the coefficient on EARN_REV is positive 
and statistically significant, (0.0545, t = 2.81, one-tailed p < 0.01), suggesting that increases 
(decreases) in earnings forecasts are associated with positive (negative) abnormal returns.  Also 
in agreement with existing work, we find that reiterations, upgrades, and downgrades are 
associated with insignificant, positive, and negative abnormal returns, respectively.  The 
intercept in column 2 is the mean abnormal return associated with a reiteration (-0.0044, t =  
-1.12, two-tailed p > 0.10).  Column 2A calculates the mean returns associated with an upgrade 
(0.0473, F = 44.84, one-tailed p < 0.01) or downgrade (-0.0894, F = 66.77, one-tailed p < 0.01) 
by summing (α0 + α2) and (α0 + α3), respectively. 
 The results for price target revisions are reported in column 3.  As predicted, TGT_REV 
is positive and statistically significant consistent with an association between positive (negative) 
abnormal returns and increasing (decreasing) price targets (0.3191, t = 9.34, one-tailed p < 0.01).  
This shows that price target revisions contain new information that is quickly impounded by the 
market.  In fact, the market reaction for a given change in a price target forecast is stronger than 
that for an equal percentage change in an earnings forecast, i.e. higher coefficient, t value, and a 
higher adjusted R2.   
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 In column 4, we examine whether each of the three summary components of an analyst 
report, forecast revisions, recommendations, and price target changes, contribute information 
beyond what’s contained in the others.  When all three are included in our regression, we find 
that earnings forecast revisions, price target revisions, and the mean return for an upgrade remain 
positive and statistically significant while the mean return for a downgrade remains statistically 
negative.  The results for price target revisions remain stronger than those of earnings forecast 
revisions.  Including the three primary components of an analyst’s report simultaneously in our 
regression increases the adjusted R2 to 22%.  Our results extend Francis and Soffer (1997), who 
only look at earnings forecast revisions and recommendations, and support Brav and Lehavy 
(2003) who show that the information in each of the three components of an analyst’s report is 
not subsumed by the other two.  Column 4A calculates, as column 2A did, the mean returns and 
F values for upgrades and downgrades by summing (α0 + α2) and (α0 + α3), respectively. 
 Regression results reported in column 5 examine the effects of affiliations between the 
firm covered and the brokerage employing the analyst issuing the report, as well as the strength 
of an analyst’s arguments by adding UND_HLD and STR_ARG.  In cases where a brokerage 
may have served as an underwriter for or has current holdings in a reviewed firm, we expect 
investors to exhibit skepticism in responding to good news and a more pronounced reaction to 
bad news resulting in α6 being negative.   We find that the coefficient for existing relationships 
between the analyst and company is statistically insignificant contradicting prior work (-0.0011,  
t = -0.16, one-tailed p > 0.10).7  
 We predict that the strength of arguments contained in the report is likely to amplify 
investor’s reactions to both good and bad news suggesting that α5 will be positive.  The 
coefficient on STR_ARG is positive and statistically significant (0.0104, t = 4.40, one-tailed p < 
0.01) indicating that investors react to a report’s contents even in the presence of the three 
primary components previously discussed.  However, once information regarding the strength of 
an analyst’s arguments (as contained in a report’s text) is considered, investors appear to rely less 
                                                 
7 We calculate our underwriting holdings variable several ways.  In Eq. (1), reported in Table 3, the variable takes a 
value of 0 if there is no relationship, 1 if the brokerage is an underwriter or has holdings and 2 if it is both an 
underwriter and has holdings. We also examine holdings and underwriting relationship as separate variables. There 
are no significant results, regardless of how the variable is specified.  
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on earnings forecast revisions and upgrade labels.  Earnings forecast revisions are now less 
significant (0.0618, t = 1.77, one-tailed p < 0.10) and the mean return for upgrades, given in 
Column 5A, is now 0.0011 with an insignificant F value.  Price targets and the mean return for 
downgrades remain highly significant (0.2116, t = 5.76, one-tailed p < 0.01 and -0.0551, t = 
10.69, one-tailed p < 0.01 respectively).  We examine the effects of report type on the market’s 
reaction to the release of an analyst’s report in more detail in Section 4.4. 
 The importance of the analyst’s arguments in explaining the market’s reaction to the 
release of a report also holds if we split the strength of arguments variable into its positive and 
negative components.  That is, we tally separately positive and negative justifications and 
include them in our regression as two variables.  The positive argument coefficient is 0.0071 
with a t-statistic of 2.41 and the negative argument coefficient is -0.0205 with a t-statistic of  
-3.53.  This suggests that negative comments have a larger impact on the market than do positive 
ones, but that both are important.  Although not reported here, when the strength of arguments 
variable is split into positive and negative components, the coefficients on earnings forecast 
revisions, price target revisions, and upgrades and downgrades are similar to those reported in 
Table 3, Column 5.  
 In addition to disaggregating our strength of arguments variable into its positive and 
negative components, we consider each of our 28 justification variables independently.  That is, 
we added 28 dummy variables to the regression, e.g. positive revenue growth, negative revenue 
growth, positive cost savings, negative cost savings, etc.  The regression results using these 28 
variables are reported in Table 4.  The coefficients and significance levels on earnings revisions, 
target price changes, and upgrades and downgrades are similar to those in Table 3, Column 5.  
Nine of the 28 justification variables are significant, with the correct predicted sign, at the 10% 
level.  Of these, seven are significant at the 5% level; including positive comments regarding 
repurchases, new projects and risks, and negative comments regarding product introduction and 
international operations.  One variable, negative management comments, is significant at the 
10% level with the wrong sign.  
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 Overall, our results in Tables 3 and 4 replicate the findings of prior research that earnings 
forecast revisions and recommendation changes are positively and significantly associated with 
the market’s reaction at the time a security analyst report is released.  Our results also provide 
support for the hypothesis that price target changes contain information even in the presence of 
the other key components of an analyst report.  This price target information is significant and is 
stronger than that contained in earnings forecast revisions.  Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, we demonstrate the value of including the strength of arguments presented by an 
analyst in support of his recommendations.  In fact, once strength of arguments is controlled for, 
the earnings revision and recommendation upgrades are both less significant.  Moreover, the 
adjusted R² for our regression is significantly larger than that found in previous work for either 
individual variables or less complete multivariate specifications.  
 
4.2. Firm Specific Variables 
It is a well-known result that the market reaction to analyst earnings forecasts revisions 
and recommendation changes varies by the firm’s information environment (e.g., Lys and Sohn, 
1990; Stickel, 1995).  Common proxies for the prevalence of information about a firm are its size 
and analyst following.  The reasons commonly given for these results is that individual analysts 
play a more important function for smaller firms that have less institutional ownership, less press 
coverage, and less analyst following.  Whether a firm is a growth or value firm (as measured by 
market-to-book) is another factor that may influence the impact of information releases.   
Table 5 presents the results from estimating a version of Eq. (1) modified to include firm 
size cross-products in addition to our report variables (i.e., earnings forecast revisions, 
recommendation changes, price target revisions, strength of arguments and affiliation).  Column 
1 shows that the cross product of earnings forecast revision with size is significantly negative  
(-0.0280, t = -2.92, p < 0.001).  This suggests, consistent with prior literature, that the market 
reaction to earnings revisions is smaller for large firms when EARN_REV is the only factor 
considered.  In Column 2 the cross product of firm size with downgrades shows that the market’s 
reaction is less negative for larger firms in the case of downgrades.  Similarly, Column 3 
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demonstrates that the market reaction to price target revisions is significantly less for larger 
firms.  When all the factors are considered simultaneously in Column 5, however, just as in 
Table 3, the importance of earnings forecast revisions and recommendation changes is now 
reduced.  The earnings coefficient is still positive but no longer significant.  Price targets and the 
strength of arguments variable remain significant in the direction predicted and the effect of size 
on price targets remains.  Also, as in Table 3, the adjusted R² for the regressions are much larger 
when TGT_REV and STR_ARG are included.  
Table 6 duplicates Column 5 from Table 5 for all three firm specific factors, i.e. firm size, 
number of analysts, and market-to-book.  Column 1 duplicates Column 5 from Table 5, which 
reports the firm size cross product terms.  Columns 2 and 3 substitute number of analysts and 
market-to-book value as the cross product factors in the regression.  Although there are some 
small differences depending on which firm specific variable is used in Table 6 (i.e. EARN_REV 
times MKT_BK is significant in Column 3 but not Columns 1 and 2) the noteworthy results from 
Table 5 hold.  TGT_REV and STR_ARG are positive, large, and statistically significant in all 
three columns.  Furthermore, the coefficients for all three factors interacted with TGT_REV are 
negative and statistically significant.  
 
4.3. Other Information Releases 
The analyst literature usually measures the market’s reaction to the release of new 
information by focusing on a short event window centered on a report’s release date.  As such, it 
implicitly assumes that a report provides new and unique information to the market and is not 
contemporaneous with other releases.  This is not necessarily true.  Analyst reports may simply 
publicize or reiterate information already public (e.g., firms release their own earnings reports, 
10-Qs, press releases, etc.).  This possibility, that analysts merely publicize other information 
releases, is not currently considered in the literature.  
To analyze the question of whether analysts provide new information for our sample (and 
by extension for much of the analyst literature), we collect simultaneous information events, as 
detailed above in Section 3.5.  To be conservative, we use a nine-day window equal to plus or 
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minus two days around our five-day return window (i.e., plus or minus four days centered on the 
report date).  We find that other announcements take place approximately 53% of the time.  After 
excluding all of these possible contemporaneous events, we rerun our analysis on the sample of 
analyst reports that occur independently.8   Table 7 (which duplicates Table 3 on this more 
restrictive sample) reports the results.  The results are qualitatively similar to those reported in 
Table 3, and the adjusted R² for column five changes from 0.2529 to 0.2591 despite the large 
decrease in sample size.  That is, removing other simultaneous announcements reinforces our 
previous conclusions.  This result supports the view that many analysts’ reports provide new 
information or analysis.   We also run the regression on the sample of analyst reports that has 
other information releases within the nine-day window examined.  The results, not reported in a 
table, show that when the complete model is run on this sub-sample only the coefficients 
TGT_REV and STR_ARG remain significant (0.2217, t = 3.31, p < 0.001 and 0.0130, t = 3.17, p 
< 0.001) although the adjusted R² remains at 0.2479.  These results highlight that analysts also 
have a role in interpreting information released from alternative sources.  
 
4.4. The effects of report type 
Prior research, the CARs in Table 1, Panel C, and columns 2 and 2A of Tables 3 and 7 
indicate that the market reacts as predicted to changes in recommendations, i.e. positively to 
upgrades and negatively to downgrades.  This holds even when earnings forecast revisions and 
price target revisions are added as shown in columns 4 and 4A of Tables 3 and 7.  However, 
columns 5 and 5A indicate that additional information, i.e. strength of arguments, affects 
upgrades differently from downgrades.  In this section, we further investigate the effects of the 
information released in an analyst report by conditioning on the direction of the recommendation 
revision.   
Current evidence on whether or not investors tend to place greater reliance on specific 
information in an analyst’s report conditional on report type (e.g., upgrade, downgrade, or 
reiteration) is inconclusive.  As stated earlier, Francis and Soffer (1997) find that investors place 
                                                 
8 We did not collect information on conference calls that did not result in a press release to the news media.  
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greater weight on earnings forecast revisions for favorable reports while Hirst, Koonce, and 
Simko (1995) find that investors are more likely to analyze other information when reports are 
unfavorable.  Our database allows us to examine this question utilizing a broader set of 
information than that available to Francis and Soffer and overcomes the shortcomings associated 
with an experimental setting such as the one employed by Hirst, Koonce, and Simko.  To 
investigate whether potential investors assess the information contained in security analysts’ 
reports conditional on whether the report is an upgrade, a reiteration, or a downgrade, we 
estimate the following regression using ordinary least squares:   
 CARj,t = γ0 + γ1EARN_REVj,t + γ2UP_GRj,t + γ3DOWN_GRj,t + γ4TGT_REVj,t 
                            + γ5 STR_ARGj,t + γ6 UND_HLDj,t + γ7EARN_REVj,t * UP_GRj,t  
                            + γ8EARN_REVj,t * DOWN_GRj,t  + γ9TGT_REVj,t * UP_GRj,t  
                            + γ10TGT_REVj,t * DOWN_GRj,t    + γ11STR_ARGj,t * UP_GRj,t  
                            + γ12STR_ARGj,t * DOWN_GRj,t    + γ13UND_HLDj,t * UP_GRj,t  
                            + γ14UND_HLDj,t * DOWN_GRj,t  + ξj,t (2) 
Eq. (2) is simply Eq. (1) modified by the addition of eight interaction variables computed as 
EARN_REV*UP_GR, EARN_REV*DOWN_GR, TGT_REV*UP_GR, 
TGT_REV*DOWN_GR, STR_ARG*UP_GR, STR_ARG*DOWN_GR, UND_HLD*UP_GR, 
and UND_HLD*DOWN_GR.   
The intercept, γ0, represents an investor’s reaction to a reiteration of a prior 
recommendation, controlling for all the other information found in the analyst’s report.  
Likewise, the coefficient values on EARN_REV (γ1), TGT_REV (γ4), STR_ARG (γ5), and 
UND_HLD (γ6) represent the degree an investor reacts to earnings forecast revisions, target 
revisions, the strength of a report’s arguments, and the affiliation of the brokerage issuing the 
recommendation for a reiteration.   
Tests of hypotheses about how a report’s type affects investor reaction are based on the 
upgrade (UP_GR) and downgrade (DOWN_GR) shift and differential variables.  For example, a 
significant negative coefficient on TGT_REV*UP_GR would indicate that investors place less 
weight on target revisions for upgrades as related to reiterations.  The mean coefficients and F 
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statistics for upgrades as they relate to earnings forecast revisions, target revisions, the strength 
of a report’s arguments and the affiliation characteristics of the brokerage issuing the 
recommendation are captured by (γ1 + γ7, EARN_REV + EARN_REV * UP_GR), (γ4 + γ9, 
TGT_REV + TGT_REV * UP_GR), (γ5 + γ11, STR_ARG + STR_ARG * UP_GR), and (γ6 + γ13, 
UND_HLD + UND_HLD * UP_GR).  Similarly the mean coefficients and F statistics for 
downgrades are given by (γ1+ γ8, EARN_REV + EARN_REV * DOWN_GR), (γ4 + γ10, 
TGT_REV + TGT_REV * DOWN_GR), (γ5 + γ12, STR_ARG + STR_ARG * DOWN_GR), and 
(γ6 + γ14, UND_HLD + UND_HLD * DOWN_GR).  
 Table 8 reports the results from estimating Eq. (2) organized by recommendation revision 
type.  Our sample is now restricted to only analyst reports without other simultaneous 
information releases.9  We find evidence that investors assess the information contained in 
security analysts’ reports conditional on whether the report is an upgrade, a reiteration, or a 
downgrade.  Investors appear most interested in an analyst’s supporting documentation and 
affiliation in the case of a downgrade.  As expected, TGT_REV (γ4 + γ10 = 0.5074, F = 19.98, 
one-tailed p < 0.01), and STR_ARG (γ5 + γ12 = 0.0255, F = 5.50, one-tailed p < 0.05) are both 
significantly positive while UND_HLD is significantly negative (γ6 + γ14 = -0.0529, F = 2.77, 
one-tailed p < 0.05).  In the case of reiterations, only TGT_REV (γ4 = 0.1198, t = 2.34, one-tailed 
p < 0.05) and STR_ARG (γ5 = 0.0081, t = 2.40, one-tailed p < 0.05) are statistically significant.  
Unlike downgrades, investors do not appear to adjust their reaction in response to UND_HLD 
for reiterations (γ6 = 0.0022, t = 0.19, one-tailed p > 0.10). 
 In contrast to the results observed for downgrades and reiterations, but consistent with 
Hirst, Koonce, and Simko (1995), investors do not appear to investigate beyond report type in 
the case of upgrades.  The mean return for upgrades is large, positive, and statistically significant 
(γ0 + γ2 = 0.0712, F = 6.86, one-tailed p < 0.01).  However, the coefficient estimates for 
TGT_REV (γ4 + γ9 = -0.0257, F = 0.08, one-tailed p > 0.10), and UND_HLD (γ6 + γ13 = -0.0013, 
F = 0.01, one-tailed p > 0.10) are both insignificant.  The only anomaly in our results is the 
significantly negative coefficient on STR_ARG for upgrades (γ5 + γ11 = -0.0094, F = 2.35, one-
                                                 
9 Results for the entire sample generally show similar R², coefficient size and significance levels for our variables.  
Any differences will be pointed out in the discussion of results. 
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tailed p < 0.10), which is the opposite of our predicted sign.  The coefficient for EARN_REV is 
insignificant for all recommendation revision types.  This is consistent with Tables 3 and 7, 
which show that EARN_REV is less significant when a more complete regression, including 
TGT_REV and STR_AGR, is used10. 
 These results lead to the conclusion that investors pay closer attention to the total content 
of analyst reports in the case of downgrades and reiterations.  This is not surprising in the case of 
reiterations since the recommendation level does not contain much new information.  However, 
investors seem to read downgrade reports closely, utilizing more supporting information than in 
the case of upgrades.  Even though other information contained in an analyst’s report beyond the 
summary recommendation is not significant in the case of recommendation upgrades, the 
contents of a report are still important for reiterations and downgrades.  As shown in Table 1, 
these two categories constitute 76.6% of all reports issued during our sample period. 
 
5. Price Target Accuracy  
 Price targets received most of the analyst media coverage prior to the recent emphasis on 
recommendation levels.  Headlines such as “Price Targets are Hazardous to Investors’ Wealth” 
or “Forget Analysts’ Price Targets. They’re Really Just for Show” represent the content of these 
articles (see Morgenson, 2001; Maiello, 2000).  Skepticism about analysts’ research and the 
projections they produce has also captured the attention of members of congress and the SEC 
(see Tully, 2001).  As discussed earlier, analysts may be more likely to issue highly favorable 
recommendations due to concerns over personal compensation, relationships with the analyzed 
firms’ management, or their own firm’s underwriting business.  Price targets may either be a way 
for analysts to ameliorate the effects of overly optimistic reports, or a part of the sales hype used 
to peddle stocks.  In sections 4.1 through 4.4, we provide evidence consistent with price target 
changes containing important additional information used by investors.  This result is especially 
true for reiterations and downgrades.  This is proof that the market does react to price targets, the 
                                                 
10 When the entire sample is used to estimate the regressions, the coefficient for EARN_REV is positive and 
statistically significant for downgrades as predicted. 
  
 
28 
question now becomes should they?  In this section, we provide some results on price target 
accuracy.    
 A price target is really a combination of several forecasts.  First, an analyst must evaluate 
the firm’s specific cash flows and risk level.  Second, an evaluation of the industry’s prospects 
must be completed.  Finally, an assessment of the macro-economic factors that affect the overall 
market must be undertaken.  We do not attempt to separate or model these forecasts but do 
examine whether price targets are achieved.   
Our analysis uses 818 price targets issued between 1997 and 1999.  Of this sample, 796 
forecasts are for a price target above the current price.  For this sub-sample, we consider a price 
target prediction to be accurate if the analyzed firm’s stock price equals or exceeds the projected 
price at any time during the 12-month period following the release of a report.  Most, but not all 
analysts, list a twelve-month time horizon for their price targets.  For the remaining 22 targets 
that forecast price decreases, we consider an analyst to be accurate and the target achieved if the 
stock price falls below the price target.  Table 9, Panel A, presents price target accuracy and the 
time necessary to achieve it categorized by the type of recommendation.  For the overall sample, 
we find that price forecasts are achieved in 54.3% of all cases.  Although not broken-out in Table 
9, price targets below the current price are achieved in 20 of the 22 instances. 
Table 9, Panel B, Column 1, Target Missed, presents the average percentage of the price 
target achieved by the 45.7% of the firms that do not reach the analysts’ price target.  The ratio is 
the maximum price achieved within 12 months divided by the price target if the price target is set 
above the current price, and the price target divided by the minimum price achieved within 12 
months if the price target is set below the current price.  Column 3, Target Achieved, shows that 
firms that achieve the price target usually overshoot it by an average of 37% during the 12 
months.  We do not consider subsequent price target revisions that may reduce this overshooting 
percentage.     
Although not shown, the probability of achieving a particular target is highly dependent 
on the level of optimism exhibited by the analyst.  Price targets that project a change of zero to 
ten percent and ten to twenty percent are achieved 74.4% and 59.6% of the time, respectively.  In 
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contrast, price targets that project a change in price of 70% or more are realized in less than 25% 
of the cases observed. 
Taken together, Panels A and B of Table 9 show that slightly more than 50% of the price 
targets are achieved.  In instances where price forecasts are missed, the average maximum 
(minimum) price observed for projected increases (decreases) was 84% of the price target.  
Whether this is a good record of accuracy in a rising market is a conclusion we leave to the 
reader.   
 
6. Valuation Methodology  
Most methodologies used in valuing stocks fall into one of three major categories; 
earnings or cash flow multiples, discounted cash flow (DCF) models, and asset multiples.  
Earnings or cash flow multiples used by analysts include price to earnings (PE) ratios, relative 
price to earnings (Relative PE) ratios, earnings before interest, tax, deprecation, and amortization 
(EBITDA) multiples, and revenue multiples.  DCF models use estimated discount rates and 
projected cash flows, and include free cash flow to the firm, free cash flow to equity, and 
enterprise value added (EVA).  Analysts use market-to-book value as their asset multiple.  We 
group all other valuation methodologies under other models.  These are usually unique to the 
individual analyst and are not recognizable to the readers of modern finance textbooks.  
The first question we ask in this section is does the market react differently depending on 
the valuation methodology employed?  We add valuation dummies to Eq. (1) and find that these 
valuation methodologies are insignificant in all our regressions.11  That is, the market does not 
react differently depending on the valuation methodology used by the analyst or whether the 
analyst uses one or many.  As business school professors who teach DCF as the superior 
valuation method, we find this result disappointing.  The methodology is either being misapplied 
or it is not significant.12   
                                                 
11 We run the valuation methodologies as individual dummies, i.e. PE, relative PE, etc, and as major categories, i.e. 
earnings multiples, DCF, asset multiples, and other.  We do no report these results but they are available from the 
authors. 
12 It is possible that a number of analysts use a DCF model to predict prices but translate this into earnings multiples 
for the text of their report.  However, Black (1999) surveys analysts and finds that only 15.2% report using present 
value methods.  This is in line with the 12.8% reported in Table 1, Panel A. 
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Next, in Table 10, we examine whether the valuation methodology employed by an 
analyst affects the probability of achieving a particular target.  The various iterations of earnings 
multiples, i.e. PE, relative PE, EBITDA, and revenue multiples are fairly consistent in accuracy.  
The percentage of target prices achieved ranges from 48.4% for EBITDA multiples to 55.1% for 
revenue multiples.  Note that 99% of analyst reports in our sample use PE multiples.  The 
accuracy of DCF models falls within this range with 52.3% of target prices achieved.  Price to 
book models are slightly less accurate with 45.5%.  Analysts are least successful in predicting 
target prices when they use EVA or other models, i.e. where the analyst employs a “unique” 
method that is not used by other analysts or covered in most valuation textbooks.  The number of 
analysts that use these other models, however, is much lower than for any other category.   
 
7. Conclusion  
 This paper first describes the content of security analyst reports and then examines the 
reaction of the market to all the elements of those reports.  Using a database constructed from 
security analyst reports issued between 1997 and 1999, we replicate prior research that earnings 
forecast revisions and recommendation revisions are significantly and positively associated with 
the market’s reaction at the time a security analyst report is released.  Next, we examine price 
targets and find that the market reaction to price target revisions is stronger than that of an equal 
percentage change in earnings forecasts.  Price target revisions also contain new information 
even in the presence of earnings revisions and stock recommendations.  In addition, the adjusted 
R2 on our models increases measurably when price target changes are added.   
We then investigate the strength of an analyst’s argument by examining the justifications 
provided in an analyst report.  These justifications provide significant to the market both 
individually and in aggregate.  Furthermore, the significance of the market’s reaction associated 
with changes in earnings forecasts is reduced (in some models below standard statistical cut-offs) 
when proxies for the strength of an analyst’s arguments and the price target revisions are 
included in the regression models.   
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Next, by examining information releases that occur contemporaneously with the analyst 
report, we find that approximately half of our reports contain new information not previously 
released.  The market reacts to all of the elements of these reports as described above.  For those 
reports that occur with other information releases, the market reacts to the analyst price targets 
and to the justifications provided.  This suggests that analyst reports also have a role in 
interpreting information from other sources.  Future studies of analyst reports should consider 
whether the information contained is new or an interpretation.    
 We also examine whether investors assess the information contained in security analysts’ 
reports conditional on whether the report is an upgrade, a reiteration, or a downgrade.  We find 
that investors place the greatest reliance on the content of security analyst reports when it is a 
downgrade.  For reiterations the only elements that matter are target prices and the justifications 
given.  For upgrades none of the elements are important statistically.   
  Finally, we provide an examination of the accuracy of price targets and the importance of 
valuation methodology.  We find that approximately 54% of analysts’ price targets are achieved 
within 12 months.  When the target is missed, the average maximum (minimum) price observed 
for projected increases (decreases) was 84% of the price target.  We fail to observe any 
systematic association between the valuation method employed by an analyst and either the 
market’s reaction or the probability of achieving a price target.   
  In summary the addition of both target prices and the analyst justifications are important 
in explaining the market’s reaction to analyst reports.  The market reacts positively and 
significantly to these two sources of information regardless of what other report elements are 
considered and regardless of whether other information is announced contemporaneously.  Their 
inclusion increases the adjusted R2 of all of the models employed significantly.   
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TABLE 1: Panel A 
 
Security Analyst Report Descriptive Statistics  
Percentages of Reports Containing Selected Data Organized by Type of Recommendation 
 
 Strong Buy Buy Hold Sell S_Sell All Total 
 Up Reit Up Reit Down Up Reit Down Reit Down Down Up Reit Down Sample 
                
Number of Reports  149 198 111 296 43 2 244 77 1 3 2 262 739 125 1126 
% of Sample 13.2 17.6 9.9 26.3 3.8 0.2 21.7 6.8 0.0 0.3 0.2 23.3 65.5 11.1 100.0 
                
Earnings Forecast                
1 Year 97.3 100.0 99.1 99.0 97.7 100.0 99.6 98.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 98.1 99.5 98.4 99.1 
Multiple Years 95.3 96.5 95.5 95.6 93.0 100.0 95.9 89.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 95.4 95.9 91.2 95.3 
                
Price Targets                 
Target Reported 94.0 94.4 98.2 91.2 95.3 100.0 11.1 50.6 100.0 0.0 100.0 95.8 65.5 65.6 72.6 
Point Estimate Provided 88.6 95.7 90.7 97.4 80.5 100.0 96.3 92.3 100.0 NA 50.0 89.2 96.9 85.4 93.8 
Projected Increase 34.6 44.0 22.6 34.3 21.0 -17.5 8.6 5.5 -9.6 NA -19.0 28.9 36.6 19.1 32.9 
                
Forecasts                
Income Statement 55.6 24.7 35.1 13.5 39.5 0.0 24.6 39.0 0.0 33.3 100.0 46.6 20.1 40.0 28.5 
Balance Sheet 12.1 3.5 9.0 2.7 2.3 0.0 2.0 10.3 0.0 33.3 0.0 10.7 2.7 8.0 5.1 
Cash flow Statement 30.9 14.6 27.9 9.8 20.9 0.0 8.6 33.8 0.0 0.0 100.0 29.4 10.7 29.6 17.1 
                
Segment Data                
Geographic 4.7 3.5 3.6 6.1 0.0 0.0 1.2 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.2 3.8 1.6 3.6 
Product 4.0 2.0 6.6 4.7 4.7 0.0 4.5 3.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 3.9 4.0 4.2 
Division 9.4 13.6 12.6 9.5 14.0 0.0 7.8 6.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.7 10.0 8.8 10.0 
                
Affiliation                 
Underwriter 60.8 64.6 44.1 53.7 60.5 0.0 43.4 39.0 100.0 66.7 0.0 53.3 53.4 46.4 52.6 
Holdings 63.5 88.4 74.8 91.9 81.4 50.0 99.6 51.9 0.0 66.7 100.0 68.2 93.4 63.2 84.2 
                
Valuation Models                
Earnings Multiples 99.3 99.5 99.1 98.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 99.2 98.9 100.0 99.1 
DCF Variations 16.8 13.1 9.9 9.5 14.0 0.0 11.5 26.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.7 11.1 20.8 12.8 
Asset Multiples 23.5 22.7 22.5 26.3 14.0 0.0 32.8 14.3 0.0 33.3 50.0 22.9 27.6 15.2 25.1 
Other 3.4 6.6 2.7 3.7 2.3 0.0 1.2 5.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.1 3.6 4.0 3.5 
                
Average Number Pages 9.5 5.7 9.0 5.3 5.9 2.0 4.5 7.5 1.0 6.7 11.5 9.3 5.1 7.0 6.3 
                
  
 
35 
TABLE 1: Panel B 
 
Security Analyst Report Descriptive Statistics  
Percentages of Reports Containing Selected Data Organized by Type of Recommendation 
 
 Strong Buy Buy Hold Sell S_Sell All Total 
 Up Reit Up Reit Down Up Reit Down Reit Down Down Up Reit Down Sample 
                
Recommendation Basis                
Revenues (Inc) 39.6 46.0 36.9 64.5 11.6 0.0 6.6 13.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 38.2 40.4 12.0 36.7 
Revenues (Dec) 0.0 1.5 3.6 1.4 9.3 0.0 4.5 40.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 2.4 28.0 5.0 
Earnings (Inc) 62.4 42.9 54.1 24.3 23.3 0.0 5.3 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 58.4 23.0 13.6 30.2 
Earnings (Dec) 0.0 0.0 3.6 5.1 23.3 0.0 6.6 19.5 0.0 100.0 0.0 1.5 4.2 22.4 5.6 
Product Intro (Pos) 26.2 17.2 18.0 20.9 7.0 0.0 8.6 3.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.5 15.8 4.8 16.1 
Product Intro (Neg) 0.0 0.5 0.9 1.4 2.3 0.0 0.0 3.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.7 3.2 0.9 
New Projects (Pos) 13.4 9.6 8.1 12.8 7.0 0.0 10.7 10.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.1 11.4 8.8 11.0 
New Projects (Neg) 0.0 0.0 0.9 1.0 2.3 0.0 1.2 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.8 2.4 0.9 
Cost Efficiencies 39.6 21.2 24.3 15.2 11.6 50.0 19.7 13.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 33.2 18.5 12.8 21.3 
Cost Inefficiencies 2.0 7.6 10.8 18.9 11.6 0.0 12.7 19.5 0.0 33.3 0.0 5.7.0 13.8 16.8 12.2 
Expectations Met 37.6 29.3 10.8 33.1 30.2 0.0 37.3 31.2 0.0 0.0 100.0 26.0 33.5 31.2 31.5 
Expectations Not Met 9.4 7.1 29.7 7.8 18.6 0.0 11.9 19.5 0.0 66.7 0.0 17.9 8.9 20.0 12.2 
M&A Activity (Pos) 28.9 10.6 21.6 13.5 18.6 0.0 6.6 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.6 10.4 12.0 14.1 
M&A Activity (Neg) 0.0 0.5 1.8 0.3 2.3 0.0 2.5 7.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.1 5.6 1.5 
Repurchases (Pos) 17.4 7.1 14.4 9.1 7.0 50.0 17.6 14.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.4 11.4 11.2 12.5 
Repurchases (Neg) 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 2.4 0.4 
Industry Climate (Pos) 24.2 12.1 18.9 11.1 9.3 50.0 4.5 3.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.1 9.2 5.6 11.8 
Industry Climate (Neg) 3.4 7.1 8.1 5.1 7.0 0.0 7.4 15.6 0.0 66.7 50.0 5.3 6.5 14.4 7.1 
Management (Pos) 37.6 15.7 25.2 27.4 7.0 50.0 4.1 22.1 0.0 0.0 50.0 32.4 16.6 16.8 20.3 
Management (Neg) 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.7 7.0 0.0 1.6 7.8 0.0 66.7 50.0 0.0 1.1 9.6 1.8 
International Ops (Pos) 19.5 9.6 11.7 32.1 4.7 0.0 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.0 17.2 1.6 15.2 
International Ops (Neg) 2.7 1.0 2.7 2.0 9.3 0.0 7.0 15.6 0.0 33.3 0.0 2.7 3.4 13.6 4.4 
Leverage (Pos) 11.4 4.0 4.5 7.4 7.0 0.0 2.5 3.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.4 4.9 4.8 5.7 
Leverage (Neg) 4.7 2.5 0.9 3.7 2.3 0.0 7.4 10.4 0.0 33.3 0.0 3.1 4.7 8.0 4.7 
Competition (Pos) 15.4 6.6 3.6 17.9 4.7 0.0 2.5 7.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.3 9.9 6.4 9.6 
Competition (Neg) 4.0 4.0 3.6 2.4 7.0 50.0 9.4 10.4 0.0 33.3 0.0 4.2 5.1 9.6 5.4 
Risk (Pos) 17.4 8.6 2.7 6.8 11.6 0.0 0.8 6.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.1 5.3 8.0 6.9 
Risk (Neg) 7.4 4.0 2.7 5.7 7.0 0.0 4.9 20.8 0.0 66.7 50.0 5.3 5.0 17.6 6.5 
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TABLE 1: Panel C 
Security Analyst Report Descriptive Statistics  
 
 Strong Buy Buy Hold Sell S_Sell All Total 
 Up Reit Up Reit Down Up Reit Down Reit Down Down Up Reit Down Sample 
                
Model Variables                 
EARN_REV 4.1 -4.4 4.0 2.4 -7.3 0.0 -5.9 -4.5 2.5 -12.1 118.8 4.1 -2.1 -3.6 -1.0 
TGT_REV 13.8 1.0 5.5 2.7 -7.0 0.0 1.0 -7.5 0.0 NA -14.7 11.7 1.9 -7.3 2.8 
STR_ARG 3.6 2.1 1.8 2.4 0.5 1.5 0.5 -0.5 0.0 -5.0 0.5 2.8 1.7 -0.2 1.7 
UND_HLD 1.2 1.5 1.2 1.5 1.4 0.5 1.4 0.9 1.4 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.1 1.4 
CAR (%) 4.7 0.3 4.1 0.8 -7.0 10.0 -1.1 -6.4 2.2 -8.7 2.1 4.5 0.0 -6.6 0.3 
                
Firm Specific Variables                
SIZE  12.60 14.13 11.99 30.88 7.10 16.03 8.11 12.64 0.14 2.03 15.68 12.37 18.82 10.53 16.39 
ANALYSTS 9.81 12.78 9.61 11.75 9.58 7.50 9.22 10.34 2.00 5.67 12.50 9.71 11.18 10.00 10.71 
MKT_BK 2.44 2.56 2.38 3.03 1.67 2.13 1.72 1.75 1.15 0.79 1.54 2.44 2.33 1.67  2.27 
                
Information Announcements (%)               
Earnings Announcements 18.12 33.67 27.03 38.85 23.26 0.00 34.43 24.68 100.00 0.00 50.00 21.76 36.08 24.00 31.41 
Dividend Changes 0.67 2.01 2.70 1.35 0.00 0.00 2.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 1.53 1.89 0.80 1.69 
Stock Splits 0.00 1.01 0.00 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 0.54 0.80 0.44 
Changes in Expectations 3.36 10.05 11.71 11.15 23.26 50.00 14.34 12.99 0.00 33.33 0.00 7.25 11.89 16.80 11.35 
Mergers & Divestitures 10.74 11.06 8.11 10.81 6.98 50.00 8.20 11.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.92 10.00 9.60 9.94 
Lawsuits 2.68 3.02 0.90 5.74 2.33 0.00 1.23 0.00 0.00 33.33 0.00 1.91 3.51 1.60 2.92 
Debt Rating Changes  0.67 2.51 3.60 1.01 2.33 0.00 2.46 10.39 0.00 33.33 0.00 1.91 1.89 8.00 2.57 
Debt Financing 3.36 2.51 0.90 1.35 0.00 0.00 1.64 0.00 0.00 33.33 0.00 2.29 1.76 0.80 1.77 
Equity Financing 1.34 2.01 4.50 3.72 2.33 50.00 3.69 3.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.05 3.24 3.20 3.19 
Management Change 0.67 3.02 0.00 3.38 0.00 0.00 2.46 1.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 2.97 0.80 2.13 
New Products / Projects 2.68 7.54 1.80 6.76 13.95 50.00 6.97 7.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.67 7.03 9.60 6.30 
New Contracts / Clients 4.03 9.05 3.60 7.43 9.30 0.00 8.61 6.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.82 8.24 7.20 7.10 
Other 1.34 1.01 0.90 0.68 0.00 0.00 1.23 0.00 0.00 33.33 0.00 1.15 0.95 0.80 0.98 
                
No Other Announcements 63.09 43.70 57.66 40.88 51.16 0.00 40.57 51.95 0.00 66.67 50.00 60.31 41.49 52.00 47.03 
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Notes to table 1: All numbers presented are percentages unless otherwise noted.  The estimates for the model variables, EARN_REV, TGT_REV, STR_ARG, and UND_HLD, are 
means of the respective variables not percentages.  They are defined as follows: EARN_REVj,t = percentage change in the analyst’s projected earnings forecast for firm j at time t 
computed as [(earnings forecast at time t / earnings forecast at time t-1) – 1]; TGT_REVj,t = percentage change in the analyst’s projected price target for firm j at time t computed 
as [(price target at time t / price target at time t-1) – 1]; STR_ARGj,t = a variable computed by aggregating the number of positive remarks less the number of negative remarks 
related to 14 specific criteria: revenue growth, earnings growth, new product introductions, new projects, cost efficiencies, expectations met, mergers and acquisitions, repurchase 
programs, industry climate, management, international operations, leverage, competition, and risk; UND_HLDj,t =  a variable taking on the value 0 if no relationship between the 
analyst’s brokerage and the firm exists, 1 if the brokerage is an underwriter of the firm or has current holdings in the firm, and 2 if the brokerage is both an underwriter and has 
current holdings; and CARj,t = five-day market adjusted cumulative abnormal return for firm j centered on the report release date.  The firm specific variables analyzed are SIZE = 
the market value reported by CRSP (log of market value is used in OLS regressions); ANALYSTS = the number of analysts following the firm as reported by ZAKS; and 
MKT_BK is the firm’s market-to-book ratio.  The INFORMATION ANNOUNCEMENTS categories are press releases that occur within plus or minus four days from the analyst 
report.  They are defined as follows; Earnings Announcements = quarterly company announcement regarding earnings; Dividend Changes = company announcement regarding 
increase or decrease in dividend amount; Stock Splits = announcement regarding stock splits or stock dividends; Changes in Expectations = announcement regarding changes in 
future expectations; Mergers & Divestitures = announcement of change or possible change in corporate business structure through a merger or divestiture; Lawsuits = 
announcement regarding a new, ongoing, or completed company lawsuit involving the company; Debt Rating Changes = announcement regarding debt rating change by a major 
rating agency; Debt Financing = announcement regarding new financing or change in debt level; Equity Financing = announcement regarding stock issuance or buyback; 
Management Change = company announcement regarding significant changes in senior management; New Products / Projects = announcement regarding the development, 
approval, or marketing of a new product or investment project; New Contracts / Clients = announcement regarding significant new corporate partnership or client business; and 
Other = other significant announcement.  NO OTHER ANNOUNCEMENTS is the percentage of analyst reports without any press releases within plus or minus four days.  The 
percentage of announcements may be greater than 100% because of multiple announcements or more than one type of information released in single announcements.  Up, Reit, 
and Down refer to upgrades, reiterations, and downgrades.   
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TABLE 2 
 
Pearson / Spearman Correlation Coefficients 
 
 UP_GR  DOWN_GR  REIT  CAR  EARN_REV  TGT_REV  STR_ARG  UND_HLD  
                 
                 
UP_GR       0.2721   *** 0.0980   ** 0.2062   *** 0.2685  *** -0.1570 *** 
       <.0001  0.0152    <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  
                 
DOWN_GR       -0.2994   *** -0.0560   -0.2777  *** -0.2784   *** -0.1160 *** 
       <.0001  0.1663    <.0001  <.0001  0.0023  
                 
REIT       -0.0572    -0.0464  0.0163    -0.0671   * 0.2121 *** 
       0.1329    0.2516    0.7470    0.0780    <.0001  
                 
CAR 0.3068  *** -0.2514  *** -0.1180 ***   0.1130  *** 0.4266   *** 0.3343   *** -0.0330  
 <.0001    <.0001    0.0019      0.0051    <.0001    <.0001    0.3872  
                 
EARN_REV 0.1285  *** -0.1459   *** -0.0129    0.1883   ***    0.2312   *** 0.1728   *** -0.0288  
 0.0014    0.0003    0.7492    <.0001       <.0001    <.0001    0.4769  
                 
TGT_REV 0.2594  *** -0.2635   *** -0.0376    0.2945   *** 0.2966   ***    0.3720   *** -0.0331  
 <.0001    <.0001    0.4573    <.0001    <.0001       <.0001    0.5127  
                 
STR_ARG 0.2466  *** -0.2507   *** -0.0646   * 0.3002   *** 0.4006   *** 0.3619  ***   0.0304  
 <.0001    <.0001    0.0894    <.0001    <.0001    <.0001      0.4252  
                 
UND_HLD -0.1260 *** -0.1031 *** 0.1765 *** -0.0425  0.0116  -0.0235  0.0450    
 0.0009  0.0067  <.0001  0.2643  0.7745  0.6413  0.2371    
 
  
Notes to table 2:  This table presents the Pearson (upper triangle) and Spearman (lower triangle) correlations for the following variables:  UP_GRj,t = a variable taking on the value 
1 for reports issued for firm j at time t that indicates the analyst’s recommendation has been upgraded, 0 otherwise; DOWN_GRj,t = a variable taking on the value 1 for reports 
issued for firm j at time t that indicates the analyst’s recommendation has been downgraded, 0 otherwise; REITj,t = a variable taking on the value 1 for reports issued for firm j at 
time t that indicates the analyst’s recommendation has been reiterated, 0 otherwise; CARj,t = five-day market adjusted cumulative abnormal return for firm j centered on the report 
release date t; EARN_REVj,t = percentage change in the analyst’s projected earnings forecast for firm j at time t computed as [(earnings forecast at time t / earnings forecast at time 
t-1) – 1]; TGT_REVj,t = percentage change in the analyst’s projected price target for firm j at time t computed as [(price target at time t / price target at time t-1) – 1]; STR_ARGj,t 
= a variable computed  aggregating the number of positive remarks less the number of negative remarks related to 14 specific criteria: revenue growth, earnings growth, new 
product introductions, new projects, cost efficiencies, expectations met, mergers and acquisitions, repurchase programs, industry climate, management, international operations, 
leverage, competition, and risk; UND_HLDj,t =  a variable taking on the value 0 if no relationship between the analyst’s brokerage and the firm exists, 1 if the brokerage is an 
underwriter of the firm or has current holdings in the firm, and 2 if the brokerage is both an underwriter and has current holdings; P-values are listed below the correlation 
numbers.  * one-tailed probability < 0.10; ** one-tailed probability < 0.05; *** one-tailed probability < 0.01. 
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TABLE 3 
 
The Market’s Reaction to the Release of a Security Analyst Report: Regression Results on  
Earnings forecast revisions, Recommendations, Price Target Revisions, Argument Strength, and Affiliation 
 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign (1)  (2)  (2A)  (3)  (4)  (4A)  (5)  (5A)  
INTERCEPT ? -0.0029  -0.0044    -0.0018  -0.0009    -0.0211 *   
  (-0.78)  (-1.12)    (-0.40)  (-0.18)    (-1.70)    
EARN_REV + 0.0545 ***       0.0804 **   0.0618 *   
  (2.81)        (2.27)    (1.77)    
UP_GR +   0.0517 ***     0.0283 **   0.0222 *   
    (6.40)      (2.24)    (1.76)    
DOWN_GR -   -0.0850 ***     -0.0494 ***   -0.0340 **   
    (-7.31)      (-3.09)    (-2.10)    
Upgrade (α0+α2) +     0.0473 ***     0.0274 **   0.0011  
      (44.84)      (5.52)    (0.00)  
Downgrade (α0+α3) -     -0.0894 ***     -0.0503 ***   -0.0551 *** 
      (66.77)      (11.09)    (10.69)  
TGT_REV +       0.3191 *** 0.2552 ***   0.2116 ***   
        (9.34)  (7.06)    (5.76)    
STR_ARG +             0.0104 ***   
              (4.40)    
UND_HLD -             -0.0011    
              (-0.16)    
Adjusted R2  0.0112 *** 0.1382 ***   0.1799 *** 0.2193 ***   0.2529 ***   
  (7.91)  (56.40)    (87.21)  (28.38)    (23.00)    
N  612  691    393  390    390    
 
  
 
40 
Notes to table 3: This table presents the results of estimating the following regression using ordinary least squares:  CARj,t = α0 + α1EARN_REVj,t + α2UP_GRj,t +  
α3DOWN_GRj,t + α4TGT_REVj,t + α5 STR_ARGj,t + α6 UND_HLDj,t + εj,t where the variables are defined as follows: CARj,t = five-day market adjusted cumulative abnormal 
return for firm j centered on the report release date t; EARN_REVj,t = percentage change in the analyst’s projected earnings forecast for firm j at time t computed as [(earnings 
forecast at time t / earnings forecast at time t-1) – 1]; UP_GRj,t = a variable taking on the value 1 for reports issued for firm j at time t that indicates the analyst’s recommendation 
has been upgraded, 0 otherwise; DOWN_GRj,t = a variable taking on the value 1 for reports issued for firm j at time t that indicates the analyst’s recommendation has been 
downgraded, 0 otherwise; TGT_REVj,t = percentage change in the analyst’s projected price target for firm j at time t computed as [(price target at time t / price target at time t-1) – 
1]; STR_ARGj,t = a variable computed  aggregating the number of positive remarks less the number of negative remarks related to 14 specific criteria: revenue growth, earnings 
growth, new product introductions, new projects, cost efficiencies, expectations met, mergers and acquisitions, repurchase programs, industry climate, management, international 
operations, leverage, competition, and risk; UND_HLDj,t =  a variable taking on the value 0 if no relationship between the analyst’s brokerage and the firm exists, 1 if the 
brokerage is an underwriter of the firm or has current holdings in the firm, and 2 if the brokerage is both an underwriter and has current holdings; εj,t = assumed normally 
distributed error term with zero mean and constant variance.  t-statistics are below the estimated coefficients.  F-statistics are below the adjusted R2 and the aggregated coefficient 
estimates in columns 2A, 4A and 5A.  * one-tailed probability < 0.10; ** one-tailed probability < 0.05; *** one-tailed probability < 0.01. 
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TABLE 4 
 
The Market’s Reaction to the Release of a Security Analyst Report: Regression Results on  
Earnings forecast revisions, Recommendations, Price Target Revisions, Argument Strength 
by Justification Category, and Affiliation 
 
Variable Predicted Sign    
INTERCEPT ? -0.0072 (-0.49)  
EARN_REV + 0.0655 (1.77) ** 
UP_GR + 0.0294 (2.18) ** 
DOWN_GR - -0.0368 (-2.04) ** 
TGT_REV + 0.1884 (4.83) *** 
STR_ARG     
Revenues (Inc) + 0.0011 (0.11)  
Revenues (Dec) - -0.0686 (-2.31) ** 
Earnings (Inc) + -0.0057 (-0.58)  
Earnings (Dec) - -0.0418 (-1.92) ** 
Product Intro (Pos) + 0.0050 (0.45)  
Product Intro (Neg) - -0.0727 (-1.47) * 
New Projects (Pos) + 0.0288 (1.97) ** 
New Projects (Neg) - 0.0030 (0.07)  
Cost Efficiencies + 0.0026 (0.23)  
Cost Inefficiencies - -0.0009 (-0.06)  
Expectations Met + 0.0156 (1.51) * 
Expectations Not Met - -0.0463 (-2.79) *** 
M&A Activity (Pos) + -0.0093 (-0.67)  
M&A Activity (Neg) - 0.0250 (0.41)  
Repurchases (Pos) + 0.0270 (1.85) ** 
Repurchases (Neg) - 0.0048 (0.07)  
Industry Climate (Pos) + 0.0153 (1.17)  
Industry Climate (Neg) - -0.0223 (-1.11)  
Management (Pos) + 0.0074 (0.69)  
Management (Neg) - 0.0689 (1.85) ** 
International Ops (Pos) + 0.0103 (0.91)  
International Ops (Neg) - -0.0417 (-1.45) * 
Leverage (Pos) + -0.0178 (-0.90)  
Leverage (Neg) - -0.0048 (-0.22)  
Competition (Pos) + -0.0071 (-0.49)  
Competition (Neg) - -0.0254 (-1.04)  
Risk (Pos) + 0.0355 (2.16) ** 
Risk (Neg) - -0.0207 (-1.04)  
UND_HLD - 0.0011 (0.15)  
Adjusted R2  0.2756 (5.50) *** 
N  390   
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Notes to table 4: This table presents the results of estimating the following regression using ordinary least squares:  
CARj,t = α0 + α1EARN_REVj,t + α2UP_GRj,t + α3DOWN_GRj,t + α4TGT_REVj,t + α5 STR_ARGj,t + α6 
UND_HLDj,t + εj,t where the variables are defined as follows: CARj,t = five-day market adjusted cumulative 
abnormal return for firm j centered on the report release date t; EARN_REVj,t = percentage change in the analyst’s 
projected earnings forecast for firm j at time t computed as [(earnings forecast at time t / earnings forecast at time t-
1) – 1]; UP_GRj,t = a variable taking on the value 1 for reports issued for firm j at time t that indicates the analyst’s 
recommendation has been upgraded, 0 otherwise; DOWN_GRj,t = a variable taking on the value 1 for reports issued 
for firm j at time t that indicates the analyst’s recommendation has been downgraded, 0 otherwise; TGT_REVj,t = 
percentage change in the analyst’s projected price target for firm j at time t computed as [(price target at time t / 
price target at time t-1) – 1]; STR_ARGj,t = a variable computed  aggregating the number of positive remarks less 
the number of negative remarks related to 14 specific criteria: revenue growth, earnings growth, new product 
introductions, new projects, cost efficiencies, expectations met, mergers and acquisitions, repurchase programs, 
industry climate, management, international operations, leverage, competition, and risk; UND_HLDj,t =  a variable 
taking on the value 0 if no relationship between the analyst’s brokerage and the firm exists, 1 if the brokerage is an 
underwriter of the firm or has current holdings in the firm, and 2 if the brokerage is both an underwriter and has 
current holdings; εj,t = assumed normally distributed error term with zero mean and constant variance.  t-statistics are 
below the estimated coefficients.  F-statistics are below the adjusted R2 and the aggregated coefficient estimates in 
columns 2A, 4A and 5A.  * one-tailed probability < 0.10; ** one-tailed probability < 0.05; *** one-tailed 
probability < 0.01. 
 
  
 
43 
TABLE 5 
 
The Market’s Reaction to the Release of a Security Analyst Report: Regression Results on  
Earnings forecast revisions, Recommendations, Price Target Revisions, Argument 
Strength, Affiliation, and Firm Size 
 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
INTERCEPT ? -0.0028  -0.0044  0.0015  0.0024  -0.0214 * 
  (-0.74)  (-1.14)  (0.35)  (0.49)  (-1.77)  
EARN_REV + 0.2770 ***     0.1194  0.1582  
  (3.52)      (0.71)  (0.96)  
EARN_REV x SIZE + -0.0280 ***     -0.0120  -0.0205  
  (-2.92)      (-0.49)  (-0.85)  
            
UP_GR +   0.0680 *   -0.0606  -0.0863  
    (1.85)    (-1.00)  (-1.35)  
UP_GR x SIZE  +   -0.0020    0.0110  0.0133 * 
    (-0.45)    (1.52)  (1.76)  
            
DOWN_GR -   -0.2947 ***   -0.1401 * -0.1124  
    (-5.80)    (-1.90)  (-1.50)  
DOWN_GR x SIZE -   0.0260 ***   0.011  0.0092  
    (4.24)    (1.20)  (1.03)  
TGT_REV +     1.0787 *** 0.9431 *** 0.8402 *** 
      (8.32)  (6.17)  (5.27)  
TGT_REV x SIZE +     -0.1008 *** -0.0912 *** -0.0834 *** 
      (-6.05)  (-4.70)  (-4.16)  
       
STR_ARG +         0.0175 * 
          (1.78)  
STR_ARG x SIZE  +         -0.0009  
          (-0.74)  
       
UND_HLD -         0.0030  
          (0.16)  
UND_HLD x SIZE -         -0.0001  
          (-0.05)  
            
Adjusted R2  0.0232 *** 0.1580 *** 0.2484 *** 0.2875 *** 0.3184 *** 
  (8.25)  (33.36)  (65.78)  (20.62)  (16.14)  
N  611  690  392  389  389  
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Notes to table 5: This table presents the results of estimating the following regression using ordinary least squares 
and SIZE cross products:  CARj,t = α0 + α1EARN_REVj,t + α2UP_GRj,t +  α3DOWN_GRj,t + α4TGT_REVj,t + α5 
STR_ARGj,t + α6 UND_HLDj,t + εj,t where the variables are defined as follows: CARj,t = five-day market adjusted 
cumulative abnormal return for firm j centered on the report release date t; EARN_REVj,t = percentage change in the 
analyst’s projected earnings forecast for firm j at time t computed as [(earnings forecast at time t / earnings forecast 
at time t-1) – 1]; UP_GRj,t = a variable taking on the value 1 for reports issued for firm j at time t that indicates the 
analyst’s recommendation has been upgraded, 0 otherwise; DOWN_GRj,t = a variable taking on the value 1 for 
reports issued for firm j at time t that indicates the analyst’s recommendation has been downgraded, 0 otherwise; 
TGT_REVj,t = percentage change in the analyst’s projected price target for firm j at time t computed as [(price target 
at time t / price target at time t-1) – 1]; STR_ARGj,t = a variable computed  aggregating the number of positive 
remarks less the number of negative remarks related to 14 specific criteria: revenue growth, earnings growth, new 
product introductions, new projects, cost efficiencies, expectations met, mergers and acquisitions, repurchase 
programs, industry climate, management, international operations, leverage, competition, and risk; UND_HLDj,t =  a 
variable taking on the value 0 if no relationship between the analyst’s brokerage and the firm exists, 1 if the 
brokerage is an underwriter of the firm or has current holdings in the firm, and 2 if the brokerage is both an 
underwriter and has current holdings; SIZE = the log of market value as reported by CRSP.   εj,t = assumed normally 
distributed error term with zero mean and constant variance.  t-statistics are below the estimated coefficients.  F-
statistics are below the adjusted R2 and the aggregated coefficient estimates in columns 2A, 4A and 5A.  * one-tailed 
probability < 0.10; ** one-tailed probability < 0.05; *** one-tailed probability < 0.01. 
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TABLE 6 
 
The Market’s Reaction to the Release of a Security Analyst Report: Regression Results on  
Earnings forecast revisions, Recommendations, Price Target Revisions, Argument 
Strength, Affiliation, and Firm Specific Variables 
 
 Size  
Number of 
Analysts  
Market-
to-Book  
 
Predicted 
Sign (1)  (2)  (3)  
INTERCEPT ? -0.0214 * -0.0226 * -0.0198  
  (-1.77)  (-1.80)  (-1.58)  
EARN_REV + 0.1582  0.0878 ** 0.0387  
  (0.96)  (1.83)  (1.06)  
EARN_REV x FACTOR# + -0.0205  -0.0030  0.0113 * 
  (-0.85)  (-0.66)  (1.66)  
UP_GR + -0.0863  -0.0016  0.0117  
  (-1.35)  (-0.08)  (0.65)  
UP_GR x FACTOR# + 0.0133 * 0.0022  0.0024  
  (1.76)  (1.44)  (0.95)  
DOWN_GR - -0.1124  -0.0219  0.0017  
  (-1.50)  (-0.79)  (0.08)  
DOWN_GR x FACTOR# - 0.0092  -0.0013  -0.0092 *** 
  (1.03)  (-0.69)  (-2.65)  
TGT_REV + 0.8402 *** 0.3650 *** 0.2992 *** 
  (5.27)  (6.26)  (5.53)  
TGT_REV x FACTOR# + -0.0834 *** -0.0138 *** -0.0130 ** 
  (-4.16)  (-3.24)  (-2.34)  
STR_ARG + 0.0175 * 0.0103 *** 0.0115 *** 
  (1.78)  (2.77)  (3.66)  
STR_ARG x FACTOR# + -0.0009  0.0000  -0.0004  
  (-0.74)  (0.08)  (-1.04)  
UND_HLD - 0.0030  0.0047  -0.0048  
  (0.16)  (0.51)  (-0.60)  
UND_HLD x FACTOR# - -0.0001  -0.0003  0.0011  
  (-0.05)  (-0.63)  (1.41)  
Adjusted R2  0.3184 *** 0.2723 *** 0.2618 *** 
  (16.14)  (13.16)  (12.50)  
N  389  390  389  
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Notes to table 6: This table presents the results of estimating the following regression using ordinary least squares 
and SIZE, ANALYSTS, or MKT_BK cross products:  CARj,t = α0 + α1EARN_REVj,t + α2UP_GRj,t +  
α3DOWN_GRj,t + α4TGT_REVj,t + α5 STR_ARGj,t + α6 UND_HLDj,t + εj,t where the variables are defined as 
follows: CARj,t = five-day market adjusted cumulative abnormal return for firm j centered on the report release date 
t; EARN_REVj,t = percentage change in the analyst’s projected earnings forecast for firm j at time t computed as 
[(earnings forecast at time t / earnings forecast at time t-1) – 1]; UP_GRj,t = a variable taking on the value 1 for 
reports issued for firm j at time t that indicates the analyst’s recommendation has been upgraded, 0 otherwise; 
DOWN_GRj,t = a variable taking on the value 1 for reports issued for firm j at time t that indicates the analyst’s 
recommendation has been downgraded, 0 otherwise; TGT_REVj,t = percentage change in the analyst’s projected 
price target for firm j at time t computed as [(price target at time t / price target at time t-1) – 1]; STR_ARGj,t = a 
variable computed  aggregating the number of positive remarks less the number of negative remarks related to 14 
specific criteria: revenue growth, earnings growth, new product introductions, new projects, cost efficiencies, 
expectations met, mergers and acquisitions, repurchase programs, industry climate, management, international 
operations, leverage, competition, and risk; UND_HLDj,t =  a variable taking on the value 0 if no relationship 
between the analyst’s brokerage and the firm exists, 1 if the brokerage is an underwriter of the firm or has current 
holdings in the firm, and 2 if the brokerage is both an underwriter and has current holdings; SIZE = the log of 
market value as reported by CRSP; ANALYSTS = the number of analysts following the firm as reported by Zacks; 
MKT_BK is the firm’s market-to-book ratio; εj,t = assumed normally distributed error term with zero mean and 
constant variance.  # Factor is SIZE in Column 1, Factor is ANALYSTS in Column 2, and Factor is MKT_BK in 
Column 3.  t-statistics are below the estimated coefficients.  F-statistics are below the adjusted R2 and the aggregated 
coefficient estimates in columns 2A, 4A and 5A.  * one-tailed probability < 0.10; ** one-tailed probability < 0.05; 
*** one-tailed probability < 0.01. 
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TABLE 7 
 
The Market’s Reaction to the Release of a Security Analyst Report on the Sample with no Simultaneous Announcements:  
Regression Results on Earnings forecast revisions, Recommendations, Price Target Revisions, Argument Strength, and Affiliation 
 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign (1)  (2)  (2A)  (3)  (4)  (4A)  (5)  (5A)  
INTERCEPT ? -0.0048  -0.0071    -0.0062  -0.0058    -0.0211    
  (-0.93)  (-1.24)    (-1.04)  (-0.85)    (-1.30)    
EARN_REV + 0.0310 *       0.0507 *   0.0471 *   
  (1.47)        (1.41)    (1.95)    
UP_GR +   0.0497 ***     0.0316 **   0.0259 *   
    (6.19)      (2.28)    (1.32)    
DOWN_GR -   -0.0939 ***     -0.0724 ***   -0.0589 ***   
    (-7.33)      (-3.33)    (-2.62)    
Upgrade (α0+α2) +     0.0426 ***     0.0258 **   0.0048  
      (24.64)      (4.40)    (0.07)  
Downgrade (α0+α3) -     -0.1010 ***     -0.0782 ***   -0.0800 *** 
      (43.71)      (14.67)    (10.72)  
TGT_REV +       0.2756 *** 0.2123 ***   0.1962 ***   
        (6.43)  (4.93)    (4.49)    
STR_ARG +             0.0067 **   
              (2.19)    
UND_HLD -             0.0011    
              (0.12)    
Adjusted R2  0.0040  0.1717 ***   0.1731 *** 0.2477 ***   0.2591 ***   
  (2.15)  (34.89)    (41.41)  (16.89)    (12.25)    
N  285  327    193  193    193    
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Notes to table 7: This table presents the results of estimating the following regression using ordinary least squares:  CARj,t = α0 + α1EARN_REVj,t + α2UP_GRj,t + 
α3DOWN_GRj,t + α4TGT_REVj,t + α5 STR_ARGj,t + α6 UND_HLDj,t + εj,t where the variables are defined as follows: CARj,t = five-day market adjusted cumulative abnormal 
return for firm j centered on the report release date t; EARN_REVj,t = percentage change in the analyst’s projected earnings forecast for firm j at time t computed as [(earnings 
forecast at time t / earnings forecast at time t-1) – 1]; UP_GRj,t = a variable taking on the value 1 for reports issued for firm j at time t that indicates the analyst’s recommendation 
has been upgraded, 0 otherwise; DOWN_GRj,t = a variable taking on the value 1 for reports issued for firm j at time t that indicates the analyst’s recommendation has been 
downgraded, 0 otherwise; TGT_REVj,t = percentage change in the analyst’s projected price target for firm j at time t computed as [(price target at time t / price target at time t-1) – 
1]; STR_ARGj,t = a variable computed  aggregating the number of positive remarks less the number of negative remarks related to 14 specific criteria: revenue growth, earnings 
growth, new product introductions, new projects, cost efficiencies, expectations met, mergers and acquisitions, repurchase programs, industry climate, management, international 
operations, leverage, competition, and risk; UND_HLDj,t =  a variable taking on the value 0 if no relationship between the analyst’s brokerage and the firm exists, 1 if the 
brokerage is an underwriter of the firm or has current holdings in the firm, and 2 if the brokerage is both an underwriter and has current holdings; εj,t = assumed normally 
distributed error term with zero mean and constant variance.  t-statistics are below the estimated coefficients.  F-statistics are below the adjusted R2 and the aggregated coefficient 
estimates in columns 2A, 4A and 5A.  * one-tailed probability < 0.10; ** one-tailed probability < 0.05; *** one-tailed probability < 0.01. 
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TABLE 8 
 
The Market Reaction to the Release of a Security Analyst Report: 
The Effects of Recommendation Revision Type on the Sample with no Simultaneous Announcements 
 
 Reiterations Upgrades Downgrades 
Variable Predicted 
Sign Coefficient t-stat 
Predicted 
Sign Coefficient F-stat 
Predicted 
Sign Coefficient F-stat 
                
Intercept ? γ0 -0.0235  (-1.20)           
Upgrade      + γ0 + γ2 0.0712 *** (6.86)      
Downgrade           - γ0 + γ3 0.0454  (0.71) 
EARN_REV + γ1 0.0199  (0.55) +  γ1 + γ7 0.0949  (0.36) + γ1 + γ8 0.0684  (0.47) 
TGT_REV + γ4 0.1198 ** (2.34) +  γ4 + γ9 -0.0257  (0.08) +  γ4 + γ10 0.5074 *** (19.98) 
STR_ARG + γ5 0.0081 ** (2.40) + γ5 + γ11 -0.0094 * (2.35) + γ5 + γ12 0.0255 ** (5.50) 
UND_HLD - γ6 0.0022  (0.19) - γ6 + γ13 -0.0013  (0.01) - γ6 + γ14 -0.0529 ** (2.77) 
                
Adjusted R2 0.3822 ***              
F-stat (9.53)               
N 193               
 
Notes to table 8: This table presents the results of estimating the following regression using ordinary least squares:  CARj,t = γ0 + γ1EARN_REVj,t + γ2UP_GRj,t + γ3DOWN_GRj,t + 
γ4TGT_REVj,t + γ5 STR_ARGj,t + γ6 UND_HLDj,t + γ7EARN_REVj,t * UP_GRj,t + γ8EARN_REVj,t * DOWN_GRj,t  + γ9TGT_REVj,t * UP_GRj,t + γ10TGT_REVj,t * DOWN_GRj,t    
+ γ11STR_ARGj,t * UP_GRj,t + γ12STR_ARGj,t * DOWN_GRj,t + γ13UND_HLDj,t * UP_GRj,t + γ14UND_HLDj,t * DOWN_GRj,t  + ξj,t.  See notes to table 2 for variable definitions.  
t-statistics are to the right of the estimated reiteration coefficients.  F-statistics are to the right of the aggregated coefficient estimates for upgrades and downgrades.  The adjusted 
R2 and associated F-statistic is for the entire regression in Eq. (2).  * one-tailed probability < 0.10; ** one-tailed probability < 0.05; *** one-tailed probability < 0.01. 
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TABLE 9: Panel A 
Percentage of Reports Achieving 12-Month Price Targets by Recommendation Type 
 
  
  Target Achieved In:  
 Target 
Achieved 
1 to 3 
Months 
4 to 6 
Months 
7 to 9 
Months 
10 to 12 
Months N 
All  54.28 30.81 13.21 5.62 4.64 818 
     Upgrades 57.37 25.50 17.13 7.17 7.57 251 
     Reiterations 50.72 30.93 11.55 5.15 3.09 485 
     Downgrades 65.85 46.34 10.98 3.66 4.88 82 
       
Strong Buy 45.12 17.99 17.07 4.57 5.49 328 
     Upgrades 50.00 16.43 20.00 7.14 6.43 140 
     Reiterations 41.49 19.15 14.89 2.66 4.79 188 
       
Buy  57.14 35.48 11.67 7.38 2.62 420 
     Upgrades 66.97 36.70 13.76 11.93 4.59 109 
     Reiterations 54.81 36.67 10.00 6.30 1.85 270 
     Downgrades 46.34 24.39 17.07 2.44 2.44 41 
       
Hold  77.61 61.2 4.48 7.46 4.48 67 
     Upgrades 50.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2 
     Reiterations 73.08 53.85 3.85 11.54 3.85 26 
     Downgrades 84.62 69.23 5.13 5.13 5.13 39 
       
Sell 100.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 
     Reiterations 100.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 
       
Strong Sell 100.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 2 
     Downgrades 100.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 2 
 
Notes to table 9, Panel A: This table presents the percentage of reports achieving 12-month price targets.  The data 
is summarized by recommendation type: strong buy, buy, hold, sell, or strong sell, and by change in 
recommendation type: upgrade, reiteration, or downgrade. 
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TABLE 9: Panel B 
12-Month Price Maximums / Minimums and Predicted Price Targets (%) 
 
 
Target 
Missed N 
Target 
Achieved N 
Full 
Sample N 
       
All  84.38 374 137.27 444 113.09 818 
   Upgrades 88.05 107 130.86 144 112.61 251 
   Reiterations 82.50 239 140.07 246 111.70 485 
   Downgrades 86.37 28 141.59 54 122.74 82 
       
Strong Buy  83.20 181 129.30 147 103.86 328 
   Upgrades 87.20 71 127.53 69 107.08 140 
   Reiterations 80.61 110 130.86 78 101.46 188 
       
Buy  85.21 179 141.43 241 117.47 420 
   Upgrades 90.39 35 133.34 74 119.55 109 
   Reiterations 83.61 122 146.48 148 118.07 270 
   Downgrades 85.83 22 133.54 19 107.94 41 
       
Hold  89.00 14 141.76 53 130.74 67 
   Upgrades 66.51 1 176.95 1 121.73 2 
   Reiterations 92.75 7 128.37 19 118.78 26 
   Downgrades 88.34 6 148.41 33 139.17 39 
       
Sell NA NA 131.63 1 131.63 1 
   Reiterations NA NA 131.63 1 131.63 1 
       
Strong Sell  NA NA 105.64 2 105.64 2 
   Downgrades NA NA 105.64 2 105.64 2 
 
Notes to table 9, Panel B: This table presents the average percentage maximum and minimum stock price, as 
compared to the stock price on the date of the analyst report, within 12 months.  Maximums are calculated if the 
target price exceeds the current price and minimums are calculated if the target price is below the current price.  The 
data is broken up into target missed and target achieved categories.  
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TABLE 10 
 
Percentage of Reports Achieving 12-Month Price Targets by Valuation Methodology 
 
        
  Target Achieved In:  
 Target 
Achieved 
1 to 3 
Months 
4 to 6 
Months 
7 to 9 
Months 
10 to 12 
Months 
N  
        
All        
   Price to Earnings 54.36 31.10 13.02 6.70 3.54 791  
   Relative Price to Earnings 53.03 27.58 14.84 6.07 4.54 330  
   EBITDA 48.39 25.35 11.06 6.91 5.07 245  
   Revenue Multiples 55.05 24.77 17.44 8.25 4.59 109  
   Discounted Cash Flow 52.34 24.30 16.83 6.54 4.67 107  
   EVA 35.00 25.00   5.00 5.00 0.00 20  
   Price to Book 45.45 22.72 10.10 8.08 4.55 198  
   Other Models 37.21 18.61   9.30 6.97 2.33 43  
        
Upgrades        
   Price to Earnings 57.61 25.92 17.70 10.29 3.70 243  
   Relative Price to Earnings 53.03 21.97 16.67   9.84 4.55 132  
   EBITDA 53.93 21.35 15.73 11.23 5.62 89  
   Revenue Multiples 50.00 14.29 28.57   7.14 0.00 14  
   Discounted Cash Flow 52.78 11.11 25.00 13.89 2.78 36  
   EVA 33.33   0.00   0.00 33.33 0.00 3  
   Price to Book 59.32 22.03 22.04   8.47 6.78 59  
   Other Models 63.64 18.19 18.18 27.27 0.00 11  
        
Reiterations        
   Price to Earnings 51.07 31.63 10.89   5.34 3.21 468  
   Relative Price to Earnings 48.82 27.06 14.11   3.53 4.12 170  
   EBITDA 36.27 18.62   8.83   3.92 4.90 102  
   Revenue Multiples 59.77 27.59 17.24   9.19 5.75 87  
   Discounted Cash Flow 46.43 21.43 14.29   3.57 7.14 56  
   EVA 28.57 21.43   7.14   0.00 0.00 14  
   Price to Book 37.80 21.26   4.73   8.66 3.15 127  
   Other Models 17.86 10.72   3.57   0.00 3.57 28  
        
Downgrades        
   Price to Earnings 63.75 43.75 11.25   3.75 5.00 80  
   Relative Price to Earnings 78.57 57.14 10.72   3.57 7.14 28  
   EBITDA 76.92 65.38   3.85   3.84 3.85 26  
   Revenue Multiples 12.50 12.50   0.00   0.00 0.00 8  
   Discounted Cash Flow 73.32 66.66   6.66   0.00 0.00 15  
   EVA 66.67 66.67   0.00   0.00 0.00 3  
   Price to Book 58.33 41.66   8.34   0.00 8.33 12  
   Other Models 75.00 50.00 25.00   0.00 0.00 4  
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Notes to table 10: This table presents the percentage of reports achieving 12-month price targets and a break down 
of how quickly the price target is achieved.  The data is summarized by valuation methodology; Price to Earnings = 
ratio of current stock price divided by current EPS; Relative Price to Earnings = Price to Earnings multiple relative 
to a stock or industry index; EBITDA = multiple of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization; 
Revenue Multiples = multiples of company revenue; Discounted Cash Flow = model calculating the present value of 
predicted future cash flow; EVA = enterprise value added model discounting predicted future cash flow; Price to 
Book = current stock price divided by stock book value; and Other Models = other models not mentioned above, i.e. 
those specific to investment bank, industry analysis, or analyst.       
 
